Michal Feldman

ORCID

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2003-2024
Publications (10 Years): 139

Top Venues

CoRR

AAAI

SAGT

Publications

Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur
Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes. SODA (2024)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
Sequential Contracts. CoRR (2024)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms. CoRR (2024)
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Aviad Rubinstein
The Query Complexity of Contracts. CoRR (2024)
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka
On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare. AAAI (2024)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts. ITCS (2024)
Michal Feldman
Algorithmic Contract Design (Keynote). STOC (2024)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids. CoRR (2024)
Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. Algorithmica 86 (5) (2024)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. Math. Oper. Res. 49 (2) (2024)
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts. CoRR (2024)
Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
Pandora's Problem with Deadlines. AAAI (2024)
Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
Fair Division via Quantile Shares. STOC (2024)
Johannes Brustle, José R. Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities. CoRR (2024)
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz
Ambiguous Contracts. CoRR (2023)
Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding. Games Econ. Behav. 140 (2023)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations. CoRR (2023)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
"Who is Next in Line?" On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings. SODA (2023)
Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Interdependent Public Projects. SODA (2023)
Xiyun Zhang, Gabriela Lobinska, Michal Feldman, Eddie Dekel, Martin A. Nowak, Yitzhak Pilpel, Yonatan Pauzner, Baruch Barzel, Ady Pauzner
Correction: A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants. PLoS Comput. Biol. 19 (10) (2023)
Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost. EC (2023)
Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
Optimal Metric Distortion with Predictions. CoRR (2023)
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka
On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare. CoRR (2023)
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz
Ambiguous Contracts. EC (2023)
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur
Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes. CoRR (2023)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations. FOCS (2023)
Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
Fair Division via Quantile Shares. CoRR (2023)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts. CoRR (2023)
Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. ICALP (2023)
Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost. CoRR (2023)
Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 76 (2023)
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations. CoRR (2023)
Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. CoRR (2022)
Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. EC (2022)
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
Combinatorial Contracts. FOCS (2022)
Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
Max-Min Greedy Matching. Theory Comput. 18 (2022)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching. EC (2022)
Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat
Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents. AAAI (2022)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality. CoRR (2022)
Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Interdependent Public Projects. CoRR (2022)
Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Almog Wald
Lookahead Auctions with Pooling. SAGT (2022)
Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld
Two-Price Equilibrium. AAAI (2022)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Prophet Matching with General Arrivals. Math. Oper. Res. 47 (2) (2022)
Almog Wald, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Lookahead Auctions with Pooling. CoRR (2022)
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
Multi-Agent Contracts. CoRR (2022)
Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. CoRR (2022)
Xiyun Zhang, Gabriela Lobinska, Michal Feldman, Eddie Dekel, Martin A. Nowak, Yitzhak Pilpel, Yonatan Pauzner, Baruch Barzel, Ady Pauzner
A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants. PLoS Comput. Biol. 18 (8) (2022)
Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat
(Almost Full) EFX Exists for Four Agents (and Beyond). CoRR (2021)
Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? EC (2021)
Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld
Two-Price Equilibrium. CoRR (2021)
Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Yishay Mansour
Competitive Equilibria with Unequal Budgets: Supporting Arbitrary Pareto Optimal Allocations. CoRR (2021)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal
An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching. SOSA (2021)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections. IJCAI (2021)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. Oper. Res. 69 (1) (2021)
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
Combinatorial Contracts. CoRR (2021)
Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? CoRR (2021)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. AAAI (2021)
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
Combinatorial Contracts. FOCS (2021)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents. SAGT (2021)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents. CoRR (2021)
Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. AAAI (2021)
Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding. AAAI (2021)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Secretary Matching with General Arrivals. CoRR (2020)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets. EC (2020)
Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. CoRR (2020)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: Prophet Inequality for Vertex and Edge Arrival Models. EC (2020)
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer. CoRR (2020)
Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman
On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets. CoRR (2020)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections. CoRR (2020)
Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Approximate Modularity Revisited. SIAM J. Comput. 49 (1) (2020)
Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient. Games Econ. Behav. 123 (2020)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets. SIGecom Exch. 18 (2) (2020)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models. CoRR (2020)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong
Pricing Multi-Unit Markets. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 7 (4) (2020)
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs. SIAM J. Comput. 49 (3) (2020)
Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz
Designing Committees for Mitigating Biases. AAAI (2020)
Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir
The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics. CoRR (2020)
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer. EC (2020)
Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding. CoRR (2020)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. CoRR (2020)
Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman
On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets. WINE (2020)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. CoRR (2019)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets. CoRR (2019)
Yossi Azar, Allan Borodin, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal
Efficient Allocation of Free Stuff. AAMAS (2019)
Michal Feldman
Auction Design under Interdependent Values (Invited Talk). ICALP (2019)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. EC (2019)
Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
Max-min greedy matching. NetEcon@SIGMETRICS (2019)
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
Stable Secretaries. Algorithmica 81 (8) (2019)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers. FOCS (2019)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi
Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings. Theory Comput. Syst. 63 (7) (2019)
Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
Max-Min Greedy Matching. APPROX-RANDOM (2019)
Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 7 (3) (2019)
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein
99\% Revenue via Enhanced Competition. CoRR (2018)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong
Pricing Multi-unit Markets. WINE (2018)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing. EC (2018)
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein
99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition. EC (2018)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub
Truthful Prompt Scheduling for Minimizing Sum of Completion Times. ESA (2018)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal
An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching. CoRR (2018)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub
Prompt Scheduling for Selfish Agents. CoRR (2018)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing. CoRR (2018)

Michal Feldman.css-eqlu8i{font-size:small;padding-left:4px;}

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Top Topics

Top Venues

Michal Feldman