Erel Segal-Halevi

ORCID

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2014-2024
Publications (10 Years): 108

Top Venues

Publications

Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences. CoRR (2024)
Dinesh Kumar Baghel, Erel Segal-Halevi
k-times bin packing and its application to fair electricity distribution. CoRR (2023)
Pasin Manurangsi, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
On maximum bipartite matching with separation. Inf. Process. Lett. 182 (2023)
Eden Hartman, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann, Erel Segal-Halevi
Leximin Approximation: From Single-Objective to Multi-Objective. CoRR (2023)
Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi
A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling. CoRR (2023)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited. Am. Math. Mon. 130 (3) (2023)
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Balanced Donor Coordination. CoRR (2023)
Chester Lawrence, Erel Segal-Halevi
Computing approximate roots of monotone functions. CoRR (2023)
Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods (Extended Abstract). IJCAI (2023)
Hila Shoshan, Noam Hazon, Erel Segal-Halevi
Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints. AAMAS (2023)
Sophie Bade, Erel Segal-Halevi
Fairness for multi-self agents. Games Econ. Behav. 141 (2023)
Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi
A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling. EC (2023)
Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Balanced Donor Coordination. EC (2023)
Pasin Manurangsi, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
On Maximum Bipartite Matching with Separation. CoRR (2023)
Zsuzsanna Jankó, Attila Joó, Erel Segal-Halevi
On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting. CoRR (2023)
Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 76 (2023)
Israel Jacobovich, Erel Segal-Halevi
Efficient Almost-Egalitarian Allocation of Goods and Bads. CoRR (2023)
Haris Aziz, Xin Huang, Nicholas Mattei, Erel Segal-Halevi
Computing welfare-Maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 307 (2) (2023)
Eden Hartman, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann, Erel Segal-Halevi
Leximin Approximation: From Single-Objective to Multi-Objective. ECAI (2023)
Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Keep your distance: Land division with separation. Comput. Geom. 113 (2023)
Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets. Artif. Intell. 325 (2023)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited. CoRR (2023)
Simina Brânzei, Erel Segal-Halevi, Aviv Zohar
How to Charge Lightning: The Economics of Bitcoin Transaction Channels. Allerton (2022)
Ron Aharoni, Eli Berger, Joseph Briggs, Erel Segal-Halevi, Shira Zerbib
Fractionally Balanced Hypergraphs and Rainbow KKM Theorems. Comb. 42 (6) (2022)
Roy Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi
One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic? Soc. Choice Welf. 59 (2) (2022)
Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Mind the gap: Cake cutting with separation. Artif. Intell. 313 (2022)
Mithun Chakraborty, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited. AAAI (2022)
Fedor Sandomirskiy, Erel Segal-Halevi
Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing. Oper. Res. 70 (3) (2022)
Dinesh Kumar Baghel, Vadim E. Levit, Erel Segal-Halevi
Fair Division Algorithms for Electricity Distribution. CoRR (2022)
Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 74 (2022)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Redividing the cake. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 36 (1) (2022)
Maria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi
Fair cake-cutting in practice. Games Econ. Behav. 133 (2022)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Generalized Rental Harmony. Am. Math. Mon. 129 (5) (2022)
Samuel Bismuth, Vladislav Makarov, Erel Segal-Halevi
Partitioning Problems with Splitting and Interval Targets. CoRR (2022)
Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores. AAMAS (2022)
Elad Aigner-Horev, Erel Segal-Halevi
Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division. Inf. Sci. 587 (2022)
Hila Shoshan, Erel Segal-Halevi, Noam Hazon
Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints. CoRR (2022)
Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores. CoRR (2022)
Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi
Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting. Soc. Choice Welf. 59 (4) (2022)
Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
A Global Multi-Sided Market with Ascending-Price Mechanism. AAMAS (2021)
Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets. Artif. Intell. 300 (2021)
Mithun Chakraborty, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited. CoRR (2021)
Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation. AAAI (2021)
Itay Shtechman, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Fair cake-cutting algorithms with real land-value data. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 35 (2) (2021)
Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Graphical Cake Cutting via Maximin Share. IJCAI (2021)
Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods. CoRR (2021)
Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Keep Your Distance: Land Division With Separation. IJCAI (2021)
Erel Segal-Halevi
On Monotonicity of Number-Partitioning Algorithms. CoRR (2021)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Fair multi-cake cutting. Discret. Appl. Math. 291 (2021)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups. Am. Math. Mon. 128 (1) (2021)
Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. AAAI (2021)
Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Keep Your Distance: Land Division With Separation. CoRR (2021)
Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Ascending-Price Mechanism for General Multi-sided Markets. EUMAS (2021)
Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Graphical Cake Cutting via Maximin Share. CoRR (2021)
Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. CoRR (2020)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Haris Aziz
Fair Allocation with Diminishing Differences. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 67 (2020)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes: existence and fairness. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 34 (1) (2020)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
Envy-Free Division of Land. Math. Oper. Res. 45 (3) (2020)
Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets. AAAI (2020)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups. CoRR (2020)
Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation. CoRR (2020)
Itay Shtechman, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Fair Cake-Cutting Algorithms with Real Land-Value Data. AAMAS (2020)
Haris Aziz, Xin Huang, Nicholas Mattei, Erel Segal-Halevi
Computing Fair Utilitarian Allocations of Indivisible Goods. CoRR (2020)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shani Alkoby, David Sarne
Obtaining costly unverifiable valuations from a single agent. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 34 (2) (2020)
Haris Aziz, Xin Huang, Nicholas Mattei, Erel Segal-Halevi
The Constrained Round Robin Algorithm for Fair and Efficient Allocation. CoRR (2019)
Maria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi
Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice. EC (2019)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Fair Division with Bounded Sharing. CoRR (2019)
Erel Segal-Halevi
The Maximin Share Dominance Relation. CoRR (2019)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Quasilinear Rental Harmony. CoRR (2019)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan
Fair cake-cutting among families. Soc. Choice Welf. 53 (4) (2019)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Bipartite Envy-Free Matching. CoRR (2019)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Shani Alkoby, Tomer Sharbaf, David Sarne
Obtaining Costly Unverifiable Valuations from a Single Agent. AAMAS (2019)
Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets. CoRR (2019)
Fedor Sandomirskiy, Erel Segal-Halevi
Fair Division with Minimal Sharing. CoRR (2019)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods. Artif. Intell. 277 (2019)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods. IJCAI (2018)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Cake-Cutting with Different Entitlements: How Many Cuts are Needed? CoRR (2018)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Balázs Sziklai
Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting. Math. Soc. Sci. 95 (2018)
Arseniy V. Akopyan, Erel Segal-Halevi
Counting Blanks in Polygonal Arrangements. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 32 (3) (2018)
Mor Nitzan, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi
Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms. Soc. Choice Welf. 50 (3) (2018)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Fairly Dividing a Cake after Some Parts Were Burnt in the Oven. AAMAS (2018)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Competitive Equilibrium For almost All Incomes. AAMAS (2018)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism. AAAI (2018)
Shani Alkoby, David Sarne, Erel Segal-Halevi, Tomer Sharbaf
Eliciting Truthful Unverifiable Information. AAMAS (2018)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Redividing the Cake. IJCAI (2018)
Maria Kyropoulou, Josue Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi
Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice. CoRR (2018)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods. IJCAI (2018)
Shani Alkobi, David Sarne, Erel Segal-Halevi, Tomer Sharbaf
Making an Appraiser Work for You. CoRR (2018)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets: Settling the Open Cases. CoRR (2017)
Mor Nitzan, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi
On Level-1 Consensus Ensuring Stable Social Choice. CoRR (2017)
Simina Brânzei, Erel Segal-Halevi, Aviv Zohar
How to Charge Lightning. CoRR (2017)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong
On Democratic Fairness for Groups of Agents. CoRR (2017)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim
Truthful Bilateral Trade is Impossible even with Fixed Prices. CoRR (2017)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Balázs Sziklai
Resource-monotonicity and Population-monotonicity in Connected Cake-cutting. CoRR (2017)
Erel Segal-Halevi
Cutting a Cake with both Good and Bad Parts. CoRR (2017)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism. CoRR (2017)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Haris Aziz, Avinatan Hassidim
Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences. CoRR (2017)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Haris Aziz, Avinatan Hassidim
Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences. IJCAI (2017)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Algorithms for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal. ACM Trans. Algorithms 13 (1) (2016)
Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann
SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism. SAGT (2016)

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Publication Activity (10 Years)

Top Topics

Top Venues

Erel Segal-Halevi