Rica Gonen

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2000-2023
Publications (10 Years): 26

Top Topics

Incentive Compatible

Additively Separable

Combinatorial Auctions

Top Venues

Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst.

Publications

Rica Gonen, Martin Koutecký, Roei Menashof, Nimrod Talmon
Heuristics for Opinion Diffusion via Local Elections. SOFSEM (2023)
Piotr Faliszewski, Rica Gonen, Martin Koutecký, Nimrod Talmon
Correction to: Opinion diffusion and campaigning on society graphs. J. Log. Comput. 33 (3) (2023)
Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets. Artif. Intell. 325 (2023)
Piotr Faliszewski, Rica Gonen, Martin Koutecý, Nimrod Talmon
Opinion diffusion and campaigning on society graphs. J. Log. Comput. 32 (6) (2022)
Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
A Global Multi-Sided Market with Ascending-Price Mechanism. AAMAS (2021)
Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets. Artif. Intell. 300 (2021)
Itay Shtechman, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Fair cake-cutting algorithms with real land-value data. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 35 (2) (2021)
Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Ascending-Price Mechanism for General Multi-sided Markets. EUMAS (2021)
Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets. AAAI (2020)
Piotr Faliszewski, Rica Gonen, Martin Koutecký, Nimrod Talmon
Opinion Diffusion and Campaigning on Society Graphs. CoRR (2020)
Rica Gonen, Ozi Egri
COMBIMA: truthful, budget maintaining, dynamic combinatorial market. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 34 (1) (2020)
Itay Shtechman, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Fair Cake-Cutting Algorithms with Real Land-Value Data. AAMAS (2020)
Rica Gonen, Ozi Egri
COMBIMA: Truthful, Budget Maintaining, Dynamic Combinatorial Market. AAMAS (2020)
Rica Gonen, Anat Lerner
Towards Characterizing the Deterministic Combinatorial Constrained Efficient Space. ADT (2019)
Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi
Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets. CoRR (2019)
Moran Feldman, Rica Gonen
Removal and Threshold Pricing: Truthful Two-Sided Markets with Multi-dimensional Participants. SAGT (2018)
Piotr Faliszewski, Rica Gonen, Martin Koutecký, Nimrod Talmon
Opinion Diffusion and Campaigning on Society Graphs. IJCAI (2018)
Moran Feldman, Gonen Frim, Rica Gonen
Multi-sided Advertising Markets: Dynamic Mechanisms and Incremental User Compensations. GameSec (2018)
Rica Gonen, Ozi Egri
Two-Sided Markets: Mapping Social Welfare to Gain from Trade. EUMAS (2018)
Rica Gonen, Ozi Egri
DYCOM: A Dynamic Truthful Budget Balanced Double-sided Combinatorial Market. AAMAS (2017)
Rica Gonen
Databroker System: A New Online Advertising System That Keeps Users Engaged While Preserving Their Privacy. AAMAS (2017)
Rica Gonen, Anat Lerner
Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms - Two players case. Comput. 6 (2) (2017)
Anat Lerner, Rica Gonen
Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions. IGTR 18 (3) (2016)
Moran Feldman, Rica Gonen
Online Truthful Mechanisms for Multi-sided Markets. CoRR (2016)
Moran Feldman, Rica Gonen
Markets with Strategic Multi-minded Mediators. CoRR (2016)
Rica Gonen, Tamir Tassa
Privacy Preserving Computations for Viral Marketing: The Case of Rational Players. ARES (2016)
Niv Buchbinder, Rica Gonen
Incentive Compatible Mulit-Unit Combinatorial Auctions: A Primal Dual Approach. Algorithmica 72 (1) (2015)
Anat Lerner, Rica Gonen
Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions. IGTR 17 (4) (2015)
Anat Lerner, Rica Gonen
Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities. Games 5 (2) (2014)
Rica Gonen, Anat Lerner
The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings. Games 4 (4) (2013)
Yiling Chen, Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Robin D. Hanson, Lance Fortnow, Rica Gonen
Gaming Prediction Markets: Equilibrium Strategies with a Market Maker. Algorithmica 58 (4) (2010)
Nitza Geri, Rica Gonen
Managing Heterogeneity in Search-advertisers' Objectives. MCIS (2010)
Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov
Adaptive Incentive-Compatible Sponsored Search Auction. SOFSEM (2009)
Rica Gonen, Sergei Vassilvitskii
Sponsored Search Auctions with Reserve Prices: Going Beyond Separability. WINE (2008)
Rica Gonen
On the Hardness of Truthful Online Auctions with Multidimensional Constraints. CiE (2008)
Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Robin D. Hanson, Lance Fortnow, Rica Gonen
Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets. WINE (2007)
Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov
-Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget. WINE (2007)
Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov
Characterizing Truthful Market Design. WINE (2007)
Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov
An incentive-compatible multi-armed bandit mechanism. PODC (2007)
Mira Gonen, Rica Gonen, Elan Pavlov
Generalized trade reduction mechanisms. EC (2007)
Ittai Abraham, Danny Dolev, Rica Gonen, Joseph Y. Halpern
Distributed computing meets game theory: robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. PODC (2006)
Rica Gonen
Negotiation-Range Mechanisms: Coalition-Resistant Markets. ESA (2004)
Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, Pierfrancesco La Mura
Negotiation-range mechanisms: exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets. EC (2004)
Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, Noam Nisan
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions. TARK (2003)
Rica Gonen, Daniel Lehmann
Optimal Solutions for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions: Branch and Bound Heuristics CoRR (2002)
Rica Gonen, Daniel Lehmann
Linear Programming helps solving large multi-unit combinatorial auctions CoRR (2002)
Rica Gonen, Daniel Lehmann
Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics. EC (2000)