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Games Econ. Behav.
2000
2008
2016
2024
2000
2024
Keyphrases
Publications
volume 143, 2024
Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong
,
Joosung Lee
The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Julien Manili
Order independence for rationalizability.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Tobias Cagala
,
Ulrich Glogowsky
,
Johannes Rincke
,
Simeon Schudy
Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Peilu Zhang
,
Yinjunjie Zhang
,
Marco A. Palma
Social roles and competitiveness: My willingness to compete depends on who I am (supposed to be).
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Yuval Heller
,
Christoph Kuzmics
Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Julien Combe
,
Jan Christoph Schlegel
Reallocation with priorities.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Pietro Battiston
,
Sharon G. Harrison
Believe it or not: Experimental evidence on sunspot equilibria with social networks.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Emiliano Catonini
,
Andrey Kurbatov
,
Sergey Stepanov
Independent versus collective expertise.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
,
Antonio Romero-Medina
School choice with transferable student characteristics.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
R. Pablo Arribillaga
,
Agustín G. Bonifacio
Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Bo Chen
,
Bo Chen
Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Danny Blom
,
Bart Smeulders
,
Frits C. R. Spieksma
Rejection-proof mechanisms for multi-agent kidney exchange.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Christian Ewerhart
,
Guang-Zhen Sun
-player Hirshleifer contest.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Yoichi Kasajima
,
Manabu Toda
Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Charles Louis-Sidois
Buying winners.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Tyler Maxey
School choice with costly information acquisition.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Ville Korpela
,
Michele Lombardi
,
Riccardo D. Saulle
Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Adriana Piazza
,
Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez
Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Isaías N. Chaves
,
Shota Ichihashi
Auction timing and market thickness.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
Helmut Bester
,
József Sákovics
Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market.
Games Econ. Behav.
143 (2024)
volume 142, 2023
Ritesh Jain
,
Michele Lombardi
,
Christoph Müller
An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Lining Han
,
Ruben Juarez
,
Miguel Vargas
Robust equilibria in tournaments.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Akhil Vohra
Losing money to make money: The benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Kfir Eliaz
,
Alexander Frug
Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Daehong Min
Screening for experiments.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Bart Taub
Signal-jamming in the frequency domain.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Joseph Siani
,
Narcisse Tedjeugang
,
Bertrand Tchantcho
Influence relation in two-output multichoice voting games.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Andrew Mackenzie
,
Vilmos Komornik
Fairly taking turns.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Dimitrios Xefteris
Coordinated democracy.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Abraham Neyman
A Course on Stochastic Game Theory, by Eilon Solan, Cambridge University Press, 2022.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Wonki Jo Cho
,
William Thomson
Strategy-proofness in private good economies with linear preferences: An impossibility result.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Takaaki Abe
,
Satoshi Nakada
The in-group egalitarian Owen values.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Loukas Balafoutas
,
Helena Fornwagner
,
Brit Grosskopf
Predictably competitive? What faces can tell us about competitive behavior.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Giuseppe Attanasi
,
Claire Rimbaud
,
Marie-Claire Villeval
Guilt aversion in (new) games: Does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Mark Whitmeyer
Submission costs in risk-taking contests.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Valeria Burdea
,
Maria Montero
,
Martin Sefton
Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Daeyoung Jeong
,
Semin Kim
Stable constitutions.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Feifei Lu
,
Fei Shi
Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Sebastiano Della Lena
,
Elena Manzoni
,
Fabrizio Panebianco
On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Francesc Dilmé
Communication between unbiased agents.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Simin He
,
Xun Zhu
Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Andrew Kloosterman
,
Shakun Mago
The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Lars Ehlers
Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: District-based versus school-based admissions.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Felix Brandt
,
Patrick Lederer
,
Warut Suksompong
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Ilwoo Hwang
,
Stefan Krasa
Leadership ability and agenda choice.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Niels Boissonnet
,
Alexis Ghersengorin
,
Simon Gleyze
Revealed deliberate preference change.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Subhasish Dugar
,
Quazi Shahriar
Lying for votes.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Sung-Ha Hwang
,
Youngwoo Koh
,
Jingfeng Lu
Constrained contests with a continuum of battles.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Rainer Berkemer
,
Jens Starke
,
Atsushi Kawamoto
Sampling dynamics applied to the traveler's dilemma reveals non-Nash behavior.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)
Alexander W. Cappelen
,
Shachar Kariv
,
Erik Ø. Sørensen
,
Bertil Tungodden
The development gap in economic rationality of future elites.
Games Econ. Behav.
142 (2023)