Itai Arieli

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2011-2024
Publications (10 Years): 54

Top Topics

Incomplete Information

Social Learning

Temporal Aggregation

Extensive Form Games

Top Venues

Games Econ. Behav.

J. Econ. Theory

Publications

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Dimitry Shaiderman, Xianwen Shi
Persuading while Learning. CoRR (2024)
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
Receiver-Oriented Cheap Talk Design. CoRR (2024)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz
Robust Price Discrimination. CoRR (2024)
Itai Arieli, Srinivas Arigapudi
Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information. Games Econ. Behav. 147 (2024)
Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz
Reputation-based persuasion platforms. Games Econ. Behav. 147 (2024)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
A population's feasible posterior beliefs. J. Econ. Theory 215 (2024)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, Omer Tamuz
The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. EC (2023)
Ronen Gradwohl, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk. EC (2023)
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
Mediated Cheap Talk Design. AAAI (2023)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. EC (2023)
Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk. CoRR (2023)
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
The Value of Mediation in Long Cheap Talk. CoRR (2023)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, Omer Tamuz
The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. CoRR (2023)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Persuasion as Transportation. CoRR (2023)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. CoRR (2023)
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
Resilient Information Aggregation. TARK (2023)
Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz
Reputation-based Persuasion Platforms. CoRR (2023)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
Naive Learning Through Probability Overmatching. Oper. Res. 70 (6) (2022)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs. CoRR (2022)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs. EC (2022)
Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
Herd Design. EC (2022)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Persuasion as Transportation. EC (2022)
Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz
Mediated Cheap Talk Design (with proofs). CoRR (2022)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators. CoRR (2022)
Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz
Granular DeGroot Dynamics - a Model for Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks. EC (2022)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
Sequential Naive Learning. EC (2021)
Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz
Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks. CoRR (2021)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz
Feasible joint posterior beliefs (through examples). SIGecom Exch. 19 (1) (2021)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
Sequential Naive Learning. CoRR (2021)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov
Virtually additive learning. J. Econ. Theory 197 (2021)
Itai Arieli, Manuel Mueller-Frank
A General Analysis of Sequential Social Learning. Math. Oper. Res. 46 (4) (2021)
Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky
On Social Networks that Support Learning. EC (2021)
Gal Bahar, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Multi-issue social learning. Math. Soc. Sci. 104 (2020)
Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky
On social networks that support learning. CoRR (2020)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. CoRR (2020)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky
Identifiable information structures. Games Econ. Behav. 120 (2020)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, Takuro Yamashita
Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling. EC (2020)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. EC (2020)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov
Robust Non-Bayesian Social Learning. EC (2019)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
Private Bayesian persuasion. J. Econ. Theory 182 (2019)
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning. EC (2019)
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning. CoRR (2019)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
Naive Learning Through Probability Matching. EC (2019)
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game. EC (2018)
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game. CoRR (2018)
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The Crowdfunding Game. WINE (2017)
Itai Arieli, Manuel Mueller-Frank
Inferring beliefs from actions. Games Econ. Behav. 102 (2017)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Moshe Tennenholtz
Sequential commitment games. Games Econ. Behav. 105 (2017)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players. EC (2017)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky
Forecast Aggregation. EC (2017)
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The Crowdfunding Game. CoRR (2017)
Itai Arieli
Payoff externalities and social learning. Games Econ. Behav. 104 (2017)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
Simple approximate equilibria in games with many players. CoRR (2017)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
Random extensive form games. J. Econ. Theory 166 (2016)
Itai Arieli
Transfer Implementation in Congestion Games. Dyn. Games Appl. 5 (2) (2015)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to Bargaining. CoRR (2015)
Itai Arieli, Robert J. Aumann
The logic of backward induction. J. Econ. Theory 159 (2015)
Itai Arieli, Yehuda John Levy
Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring. Games Econ. Behav. 91 (2015)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
Average testing and Pareto efficiency. J. Econ. Theory 147 (6) (2012)
Itai Arieli, Yehuda Levy
Infinite sequential games with perfect but incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory 40 (2) (2011)