Rann Smorodinsky

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 1996-2023
Publications (10 Years): 43

Top Topics

Temporal Aggregation

Pursuit Evasion

Social Learning

Recommendation Systems

Top Venues

Games Econ. Behav.

Math. Soc. Sci.

Publications

Ronen Gradwohl, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk. EC (2023)
Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk. CoRR (2023)
Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky
The secretary recommendation problem. Games Econ. Behav. 134 (2022)
Roy Shahmoon, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents. SAGT (2022)
Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
Herd Design. EC (2022)
Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky
Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication. Math. Oper. Res. 47 (3) (2022)
Roy Shahmoon, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Data Curation from Privacy-Aware Agents. CoRR (2022)
Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
Privacy, Patience, and Protection. Dyn. Games Appl. 11 (4) (2021)
Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky
Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication. SODA (2021)
Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky
On Social Networks that Support Learning. EC (2021)
Gal Bahar, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Multi-issue social learning. Math. Soc. Sci. 104 (2020)
Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky
On social networks that support learning. CoRR (2020)
Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky
Prophet Inequalities for Bayesian Persuasion. IJCAI (2020)
Gail Gilboa-Freedman, Rann Smorodinsky
On the behavioral implications of differential privacy. Theor. Comput. Sci. 841 (2020)
Itay Kavaler, Rann Smorodinsky
A Cardinal Comparison of Experts. WINE (2020)
Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky
Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication. CoRR (2020)
Gail Gilboa-Freedman, Rann Smorodinsky
On the properties that characterize privacy. Math. Soc. Sci. 103 (2020)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky
Identifiable information structures. Games Econ. Behav. 120 (2020)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, Takuro Yamashita
Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling. EC (2020)
Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky
The Secretary Recommendation Problem. EC (2020)
Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky
Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion. CoRR (2020)
Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Social Learning and the Innkeeper's Challenge. EC (2019)
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning. EC (2019)
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
Stable Secretaries. Algorithmica 81 (8) (2019)
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning. CoRR (2019)
Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky
The Secretary Recommendation Problem. CoRR (2019)
Itay Kavaler, Rann Smorodinsky
On comparison of experts. Games Econ. Behav. 118 (2019)
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game. EC (2018)
Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Segmentation, Incentives, and Privacy. Math. Oper. Res. 43 (4) (2018)
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game. CoRR (2018)
Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Recommendation Systems and Self Motivated Users. CoRR (2018)
Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Segmentation, Incentives and Privacy. CoRR (2018)
Argyrios Deligkas, Erez Karpas, Ron Lavi, Rann Smorodinsky
Traffic Light Scheduling, Value of Time, and Incentives. IJCAI (2018)
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
Stable Secretaries. EC (2017)
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The Crowdfunding Game. WINE (2017)
Rann Smorodinsky, Shakhar Smorodinsky
The Price of Anarchy in Hypergraph Coloring Games. CoRR (2017)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky
Forecast Aggregation. EC (2017)
Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky
The Crowdfunding Game. CoRR (2017)
Itay Kavaler, Rann Smorodinsky
On Comparison Of Experts. CoRR (2017)
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
Stable Secretaries. CoRR (2017)
Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
Perception games and privacy. Games Econ. Behav. 104 (2017)
Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Designing social networks for efficient learning. CoRR (2016)
Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Economic Recommendation Systems: One Page Abstract. EC (2016)
Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Economic Recommendation Systems. CoRR (2015)
Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky
Subjective Perception Games and Privacy. CoRR (2014)
Gleb Polevoy, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Signaling Competition and Social Welfare. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2 (1) (2014)
Rakefet Rozen, Rann Smorodinsky
Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2 (2) (2014)
Inbar Aricha, Rann Smorodinsky
Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms. Int. J. Game Theory 42 (4) (2013)
Kobbi Nissim, Claudio Orlandi, Rann Smorodinsky
Privacy-aware mechanism design. EC (2012)
Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Sequential Information Elicitation in Multi-Agent Systems CoRR (2012)
Rakefet Rozen, Rann Smorodinsky
Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms CoRR (2012)
Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy. ITCS (2012)
Gleb Polevoy, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Signalling Competition and Social Welfare (Working Paper) CoRR (2012)
Sergey Kuniavsky, Rann Smorodinsky
Equilibrium and Potential in Coalitional Congestion Games CoRR (2011)
Sergey Kuniavsky, Rann Smorodinsky
Greediness and Equilibrium in Congestion Games CoRR (2011)
Kobbi Nissim, Claudio Orlandi, Rann Smorodinsky
Privacy-Aware Mechanism Design CoRR (2011)
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky, Jonathan Weinstein
Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations. J. Econ. Theory 145 (6) (2010)
Kobbi Nissim, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy CoRR (2010)
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Rann Smorodinsky
The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information. J. Econ. Theory 137 (1) (2007)
Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations - The anonymous case. Games Econ. Behav. 55 (2) (2006)
Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations. Computing and Markets (2005)
Rann Smorodinsky
Nash's bargaining solution when the disagreement point is random. Math. Soc. Sci. 50 (1) (2005)
Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz
Sequential Information Elicitation in Multi-Agent Systems. UAI (2004)
Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky
Belief-based equilibrium. Games Econ. Behav. 47 (1) (2004)
Abraham Neyman, Rann Smorodinsky
Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games. Math. Oper. Res. 29 (4) (2004)
Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky, Rakesh V. Vohra
Calibration with Many Checking Rules. Math. Oper. Res. 28 (1) (2003)
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Rann Smorodinsky
Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games. Games Econ. Behav. 37 (1) (2001)
Rann Smorodinsky
The reflection effect for constant risk averse agents. Math. Soc. Sci. 40 (3) (2000)
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Rann Smorodinsky
Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence. J. Econ. Theory 92 (2) (2000)
Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky
The speed of rational learning. Int. J. Game Theory 28 (2) (1999)
Ehud Lehrer, Rann Smorodinsky
Compatible Measures and Merging. Math. Oper. Res. 21 (3) (1996)