Yakov Babichenko

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2010-2024
Publications (10 Years): 76

Top Topics

Nash Equilibrium

Extensive Form Games

Regularized Kernel

Social Learning

Top Venues

J. Econ. Theory

Publications

Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Dimitry Shaiderman, Xianwen Shi
Persuading while Learning. CoRR (2024)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz
Robust Price Discrimination. CoRR (2024)
Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
Fair Division via Quantile Shares. STOC (2024)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
A population's feasible posterior beliefs. J. Econ. Theory 215 (2024)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, Omer Tamuz
The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. EC (2023)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. EC (2023)
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Algorithmic Cheap Talk. CoRR (2023)
Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
Fair Division via Quantile Shares. CoRR (2023)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, Omer Tamuz
The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. CoRR (2023)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Persuasion as Transportation. CoRR (2023)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. CoRR (2023)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
Naive Learning Through Probability Overmatching. Oper. Res. 70 (6) (2022)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs. CoRR (2022)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs. EC (2022)
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion. Games Econ. Behav. 136 (2022)
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion. ITCS (2022)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Persuasion as Transportation. EC (2022)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy
Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators. CoRR (2022)
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem. CoRR (2022)
Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein
Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria. Games Econ. Behav. 134 (2022)
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion. CoRR (2021)
Yakov Babichenko, Dan Garber
Learning Optimal Forecast Aggregation in Partial Evidence Environments. Math. Oper. Res. 46 (2) (2021)
Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov
Robust learning in social networks via matrix scaling. Oper. Res. Lett. 49 (5) (2021)
Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein
Settling the complexity of Nash equilibrium in congestion games. STOC (2021)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
Sequential Naive Learning. EC (2021)
Urban Larsson, Yakov Babichenko
Golden games. Theor. Comput. Sci. 891 (2021)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz
Feasible joint posterior beliefs (through examples). SIGecom Exch. 19 (1) (2021)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
Sequential Naive Learning. CoRR (2021)
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints. AAAI (2021)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov
Virtually additive learning. J. Econ. Theory 197 (2021)
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion. EC (2021)
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion. CoRR (2021)
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests. CoRR (2020)
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
Incentive-Compatible Classification. AAAI (2020)
Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein
Settling the complexity of Nash equilibrium in congestion games. CoRR (2020)
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests. EC (2020)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. CoRR (2020)
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints. CoRR (2020)
Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein
Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games (extended abstract). FOCS (2020)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky
Identifiable information structures. Games Econ. Behav. 120 (2020)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, Takuro Yamashita
Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling. EC (2020)
Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein
Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games. CoRR (2020)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. EC (2020)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov
Robust Non-Bayesian Social Learning. EC (2019)
Yakov Babichenko
Informational bounds on equilibria (a survey). SIGecom Exch. 17 (2) (2019)
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
Incentive-Compatible Classification. CoRR (2019)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
Private Bayesian persuasion. J. Econ. Theory 182 (2019)
Urban Larsson, Yakov Babichenko
Golden games. CoRR (2019)
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
Stable Secretaries. Algorithmica 81 (8) (2019)
Yakov Babichenko, Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
The communication complexity of local search. STOC (2019)
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
Sequential Voting with Confirmation Network. TARK (2019)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
Naive Learning Through Probability Matching. EC (2019)
Oren Dean, Yakov Babichenko, Moshe Tennenholtz
Paradoxes in Sequential Voting. CoRR (2018)
Yakov Babichenko, Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
The Communication Complexity of Local Search. CoRR (2018)
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
Incentive-Compatible Diffusion. CoRR (2018)
Yakov Babichenko, Dan Garber
Learning of Optimal Forecast Aggregation in Partial Evidence Environments. CoRR (2018)
Yakov Babichenko
Fast Convergence of Best-Reply Dynamics in Aggregative Games. Math. Oper. Res. 43 (1) (2018)
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
Incentive-Compatible Diffusion. WWW (2018)
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
Stable Secretaries. EC (2017)
Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein
Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria. STOC (2017)
Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman
Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion. ITCS (2017)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Moshe Tennenholtz
Sequential commitment games. Games Econ. Behav. 105 (2017)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players. EC (2017)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky
Forecast Aggregation. EC (2017)
Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman, Ron Peretz
Empirical Distribution of Equilibrium Play and Its Testing Application. Math. Oper. Res. 42 (1) (2017)
Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky
Stable Secretaries. CoRR (2017)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
Simple approximate equilibria in games with many players. CoRR (2017)
Yakov Babichenko
Query Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria. J. ACM 63 (4) (2016)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
Random extensive form games. J. Econ. Theory 166 (2016)
Yakov Babichenko, Omer Tamuz
Graphical potential games. J. Econ. Theory 163 (2016)
Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein
Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria. CoRR (2016)
Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman
Computational Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion. CoRR (2016)
Yakov Babichenko, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Aviad Rubinstein
Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy? ITCS (2016)
Yakov Babichenko, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Aviad Rubinstein
Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy? PCP for PPAD and the Inapproximability of Nash. CoRR (2015)
Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman
Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 3 (4) (2015)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to Bargaining. CoRR (2015)
Yakov Babichenko
Query complexity of approximate nash equilibria. STOC (2014)
Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman, Ron Peretz
Simple approximate equilibria in large games. EC (2014)
Yehuda Afek, Yakov Babichenko, Uriel Feige, Eli Gafni, Nati Linial, Benny Sudakov
Musical Chairs. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 28 (3) (2014)
Yakov Babichenko
How long to Pareto efficiency? Int. J. Game Theory 43 (1) (2014)
Yakov Babichenko, Omer Tamuz
Graphical potential games. CoRR (2014)
Yakov Babichenko
Axiomatic Approach to Solutions of Games. CoRR (2014)
Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman
Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium. CoRR (2013)
Yakov Babichenko
Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games. Games Econ. Behav. 81 (2013)
Yakov Babichenko, Ron Peretz
Approximate Nash Equilibria via Sampling. CoRR (2013)
Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman, Ron Peretz
Small-Support Approximate Correlated Equilibria. CoRR (2013)
Yakov Babichenko
Small Support Equilibria in Large Games CoRR (2013)
Yakov Babichenko
Query Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria. CoRR (2013)
Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman, Ron Peretz
Empirical Distribution of Equilibrium Play and Its Testing Application. CoRR (2013)
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
Average testing and Pareto efficiency. J. Econ. Theory 147 (6) (2012)
Yehuda Afek, Yakov Babichenko, Uriel Feige, Eli Gafni, Nati Linial, Benny Sudakov
Musical chairs CoRR (2012)
Yakov Babichenko
Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria. Games Econ. Behav. 76 (1) (2012)
Yehuda Afek, Yakov Babichenko, Uriel Feige, Eli Gafni, Nati Linial, Benny Sudakov
Oblivious Collaboration. DISC (2011)
Yehuda Afek, Yakov Babichenko, Uriel Feige, Eli Gafni, Nati Linial, Benny Sudakov
Oblivious Collaboration CoRR (2011)
Yakov Babichenko
Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria. Int. J. Game Theory 39 (3) (2010)