Shahar Dobzinski

ORCID

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2005-2024
Publications (10 Years): 48

Top Venues

CoRR

STOC

Games Econ. Behav.

Publications

Shahar Dobzinski, Wenzheng Li, Aviad Rubinstein, Jan Vondrák
A Constant-Factor Approximation for Nash Social Welfare with Subadditive Valuations. STOC (2024)
Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski
Combinatorial Reallocation Mechanisms. Algorithmica 86 (4) (2024)
Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker
Bilateral Trade with Correlated Values. STOC (2024)
Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Jan Vondrák
Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees. CoRR (2024)
Shahar Dobzinski, Wenzheng Li, Aviad Rubinstein, Jan Vondrák
A constant factor approximation for Nash social welfare with subadditive valuations. CoRR (2023)
Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker
Rigidity in Mechanism Design and Its Applications. ITCS (2023)
Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker
Bilateral Trade with Correlated Values. CoRR (2023)
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron
On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings. EC (2023)
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Kupfer
Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity. EC (2023)
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron
On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings. CoRR (2023)
Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Jan Vondrák
Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees. EC (2023)
Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron, Jan Vondrák
On the Hardness of Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design. CoRR (2022)
Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron, Jan Vondrák
On the hardness of dominant strategy mechanism design. STOC (2022)
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Kupfer
Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity. CoRR (2022)
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect. Games Econ. Behav. 136 (2022)
Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker
Rigidity in Mechanism Design and its Applications. CoRR (2022)
Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
Mechanism Design with Moral Bidders. ITCS (2022)
Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? EC (2021)
Shahar Dobzinski
Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders. SIAM J. Comput. 50 (3) (2021)
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Kupfer
A Note on the Gains from Trade of the Random-Offerer Mechanism. CoRR (2021)
Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? CoRR (2021)
Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski
(Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Games Econ. Behav. 130 (2021)
Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi
Simple Economies are Almost Optimal. CoRR (2021)
Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron
The communication complexity of payment computation. STOC (2021)
Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi
Simple Economies are Almost Optimal. EC (2021)
Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
Mechanism Design with Moral Bidders. CoRR (2021)
Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron
The Communication Complexity of Payment Computation. CoRR (2020)
Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker
Improved Lower Bounds for Truthful Scheduling. CoRR (2020)
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
Optimization with Demand Oracles. Algorithmica 81 (6) (2019)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren
Economic efficiency requires interaction. Games Econ. Behav. 118 (2019)
Yakov Babichenko, Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
The communication complexity of local search. STOC (2019)
Shahar Dobzinski, Nitzan Uziely
Revenue Loss in Shrinking Markets. EC (2018)
Shahar Dobzinski, Shahar Ovadia
Combinatorial cost sharing. SIGecom Exch. 16 (2) (2018)
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect. CoRR (2018)
Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan
Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? Games Econ. Behav. 108 (2018)
Yakov Babichenko, Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
The Communication Complexity of Local Search. CoRR (2018)
Shahar Dobzinski, Shahar Ovadia
Combinatorial Cost Sharing. IJCAI (2018)
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
Combinatorial Auctions with Endowment Effect. EC (2018)
Shahar Dobzinski, Shahar Ovadia
Combinatorial Cost Sharing. CoRR (2017)
Shahar Dobzinski, Nitzan Uziely
Revenue Loss in Shrinking Markets. CoRR (2017)
Keren Cohavi, Shahar Dobzinski
Faster and Simpler Sketches of Valuation Functions. ACM Trans. Algorithms 13 (3) (2017)
Shahar Dobzinski, Shahar Ovadia
Combinatorial Cost Sharing. EC (2017)
Shahar Dobzinski
Breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. STOC (2016)
Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák
Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations. J. ACM 63 (1) (2016)
Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski
(Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading. CoRR (2016)
Shahar Dobzinski
Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders. CoRR (2016)
Shahar Dobzinski
Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation. FOCS (2016)
Shahar Dobzinski
Computational Efficiency Requires Simple Taxation. CoRR (2016)
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders. Games Econ. Behav. 92 (2015)
Shahar Dobzinski, Ami Mor
On the Greedy Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions with a Random Order. CoRR (2015)
Shahar Dobzinski, Ami Mor
A Deterministic Algorithm for Maximizing Submodular Functions. CoRR (2015)
Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. WINE (2015)
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg
On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions. SODA (2015)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
Multi-unit auctions: Beyond Roberts. J. Econ. Theory 156 (2015)
Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski
Reallocation mechanisms. EC (2014)
Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski
Reallocation Mechanisms. CoRR (2014)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren
Economic efficiency requires interaction. STOC (2014)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions. CoRR (2014)
Shahar Dobzinski, Amir Ronen
Shared Resource Management via Reward Schemes. SAGT (2014)
Shahar Dobzinski, Renato Paes Leme
Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets. ICALP (1) (2014)
Keren Cohavi, Shahar Dobzinski
Faster and Simpler Sketches of Valuation Functions. CoRR (2014)
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR (2014)
Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. CoRR (2014)
Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. SIAM J. Comput. 42 (6) (2013)
Shahar Dobzinski, Renato Paes Leme
Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets CoRR (2013)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren
Economic Efficiency Requires Interaction. CoRR (2013)
Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák
Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations. SODA (2013)
Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák
The Computational Complexity of Truthfulness in Combinatorial Auctions CoRR (2012)
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden
Sketching valuation functions. SODA (2012)
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms. Math. Oper. Res. 37 (2) (2012)
Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák
On the Hardness of Welfare Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations CoRR (2012)
Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák
The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions. EC (2012)
Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák
From query complexity to computational complexity. STOC (2012)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 78 (1) (2012)
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Aviv Zohar
On bitcoin and red balloons. EC (2012)
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
Optimization with demand oracles. EC (2012)
Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. Games Econ. Behav. 74 (2) (2012)
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren
Optimization with Demand Oracles CoRR (2011)
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Aviv Zohar
On Bitcoin and red balloons. SIGecom Exch. 10 (3) (2011)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms. Comb. 31 (4) (2011)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts. EC (2011)
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy. STOC (2011)
Shahar Dobzinski
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations. STOC (2011)
Shahar Dobzinski, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Yaron Singer
Mechanisms for complement-free procurement. EC (2011)
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents. SIAM J. Comput. 40 (3) (2011)
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Aviv Zohar
On Bitcoin and Red Balloons CoRR (2011)
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
Truthfulness via Proxies CoRR (2010)
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy CoRR (2010)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira
Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders. Math. Oper. Res. 35 (1) (2010)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts CoRR (2010)
Shahar Dobzinski
An Impossibility Result for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations CoRR (2010)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 37 (2010)
Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. FOCS (2009)
Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design CoRR (2009)
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi
VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism. SIGecom Exch. 8 (1) (2009)
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. EC (2009)
Shahar Dobzinski
A Note on the Power of Truthful Approximation Mechanisms CoRR (2009)
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem. SAGT (2009)
Richard Cole, Shahar Dobzinski, Lisa Fleischer
Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions. SAGT (2008)
Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits. FOCS (2008)

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Publication Activity (10 Years)

Top Topics

Top Venues

Shahar Dobzinski