Ron Lavi

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 1998-2024
Publications (10 Years): 34

Top Topics

Bayesian Analysis

Weighted Voting Games

Markov Decision Process

Top Venues

J. Econ. Theory

Publications

Tal Alon, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash
Technical Note - Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. Oper. Res. 72 (1) (2024)
Yuval Emek, Ron Lavi, Rad Niazadeh, Yangguang Shi
Stateful Posted Pricing with Vanishing Regret via Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision Processes. Math. Oper. Res. 49 (2) (2024)
Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Hongyi Ling
From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail. AAAI (2023)
Ron Lavi, Or Sattath, Aviv Zohar
Redesigning Bitcoin's Fee Market. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 10 (1) (2022)
Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash
Principal-agent VCG contracts. J. Econ. Theory 201 (2022)
Amir Ban, Ron Lavi
Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations. Int. J. Game Theory 50 (1) (2021)
Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. CoRR (2021)
Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation. CoRR (2021)
Ido Feldman, Ron Lavi
Optimal DSIC Auctions for Correlated Private Values: Ex-Post Vs. Ex-Interim IR. WINE (2021)
Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Hongyi Ling
From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail. CoRR (2021)
Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies. CoRR (2021)
Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 72 (2021)
Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. EC (2021)
Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation. IJCAI (2021)
Yuval Emek, Ron Lavi, Rad Niazadeh, Yangguang Shi
Stateful Posted Pricing with Vanishing Regret via Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision Processes. NeurIPS (2020)
Xiaotie Deng, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Qi Qi, Wenwei Wang, Xiang Yan
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling. NeurIPS (2020)
Ron Lavi, Omer Shiran-Shvarzbard
Competition Among Contests: a Safety Level Analysis. IJCAI (2020)
Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi
Bayesian generalized network design. Theor. Comput. Sci. 841 (2020)
Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Rad Niazadeh, Yangguang Shi
No-Regret Stateful Posted Pricing. CoRR (2020)
Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
VCG under Sybil (False-Name) Attacks - A Bayesian Analysis. AAAI (2020)
Xiaotie Deng, Ron Lavi, Tao Lin, Qi Qi, Wenwei Wang, Xiang Yan
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling. CoRR (2020)
Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi
Approximating Generalized Network Design under (Dis)economies of Scale with Applications to Energy Efficiency. J. ACM 67 (1) (2020)
Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, William K. Moses Jr.
Deterministic Leader Election in Programmable Matter. ICALP (2019)
Ron Lavi, Or Sattath, Aviv Zohar
Redesigning Bitcoin's fee market. WWW (2019)
Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi
Bayesian Generalized Network Design. ESA (2019)
Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi
Bayesian Generalized Network Design. CoRR (2019)
Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
VCG Under Sybil (False-name) Attacks - a Bayesian Analysis. CoRR (2019)
Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, William K. Moses Jr.
Deterministic Leader Election in Programmable Matter. CoRR (2019)
Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash
Principal-Agent VCG Contracts. EC (2019)
Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi
Approximating generalized network design under (dis)economies of scale with applications to energy efficiency. STOC (2018)
Yuval Emek, Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Yangguang Shi
Approximating Generalized Network Design under (Dis)economies of Scale with Applications to Energy Efficiency. CoRR (2018)
Argyrios Deligkas, Erez Karpas, Ron Lavi, Rann Smorodinsky
Traffic Light Scheduling, Value of Time, and Incentives. IJCAI (2018)
Ron Lavi, Or Sattath, Aviv Zohar
Redesigning Bitcoin's fee market. CoRR (2017)
Martin Hoefer, Ron Lavi
Preface to Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory. Theory Comput. Syst. 59 (4) (2016)
Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items. J. Econ. Theory 156 (2015)
Ron Lavi, Ella Segev
Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals. Int. J. Game Theory 43 (4) (2014)
Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan
Composition Games for Distributed Systems: The EU Grant Games. AAAI (2013)
Uriel Feige, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
Competition among asymmetric sellers with fixed supply. EC (2013)
Oren Ben-Zwi, Ron Lavi, Ilan Newman
Ascending auctions and Walrasian equilibrium CoRR (2013)
Olivier Compte, Ron Lavi, Ella Segev
Efficiency of sequential english auctions with dynamic arrivals. EC (2012)
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms. Math. Oper. Res. 37 (2) (2012)
Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan
Composition games for distributed systems: The EU grant games (abstract). INFOCOM Workshops (2012)
Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi
Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding. EC (2012)
Noga Alon, Moshe Babaioff, Ron Karidi, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
Sequential voting with externalities: herding in social networks. EC (2012)
Ron Lavi, Sigal Oren
Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case. Games Econ. Behav. 76 (2) (2012)
Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. Games Econ. Behav. 74 (2) (2012)
Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming. J. ACM 58 (6) (2011)
Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan
Brief Announcement: Composition Games for Distributed Systems: The EU Grants Games. DISC (2011)
Ron Lavi, Marina May
A Note on the Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and Pareto-Optimality in Quasi-Linear Settings with Public Budgets - Working Paper. WINE (2011)
Ron Lavi, Sigal Oren
Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case. AMMA (2011)
Shay Kutten, Ron Lavi, Amitabh Trehan
Composition Games for Distributed Systems: the EU Grant games CoRR (2011)
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan
Two simplified proofs for Roberts' theorem. Soc. Choice Welf. 32 (3) (2009)
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi
VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism. SIGecom Exch. 8 (1) (2009)
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. EC (2009)
Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity. Games Econ. Behav. 67 (1) (2009)
Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies. J. ACM 56 (1) (2009)
Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits. FOCS (2008)
Ron Lavi
Searching for the possibility: impossibility border of truthful mechanism design. SIGecom Exch. 7 (1) (2007)
Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity. EC (2007)
Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov
Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies. SODA (2006)
Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov
Impersonation-Based Mechanisms. AAAI (2006)
Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items. SODA (2005)
Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, Elan Pavlov
Mechanism Design for Single-Value Domains. AAAI (2005)
Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming. FOCS (2005)
Yair Bartal, Francis Y. L. Chin, Marek Chrobak, Stanley P. Y. Fung, Wojciech Jawor, Ron Lavi, Jirí Sgall, Tomás Tichý
Online Competitive Algorithms for Maximizing Weighted Throughput of Unit Jobs. STACS (2004)
Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. Theor. Comput. Sci. 310 (1-3) (2004)
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions. FOCS (2003)
Ron Lavi, Amnon Barak
The Home Model and Competitive Algorithms for Load Balancing in a Computing Cluster. ICDCS (2001)
Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan
Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. EC (2000)
Ron Lavi, Amnon Barak
Improving the PVM Daemon Network Performance by Direct Network Access. PVM/MPI (1998)