Vishnu V. Narayan

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2016-2024
Publications (10 Years): 24

Top Topics

Regularized Kernel

Multi Robot Task Allocation

Combinatorial Auctions

Winner Determination

Top Venues

Theory Comput. Syst.

Publications

Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
Fair Division via Quantile Shares. STOC (2024)
Siddharth Barman, Vishnu V. Narayan, Paritosh Verma
Fair Chore Division under Binary Supermodular Costs. CoRR (2023)
Noah Brüstle, Sarah Clusiau, Vishnu V. Narayan, Ndiamé Ndiaye, Bruce A. Reed, Ben Seamone
The speed and threshold of the biased perfect matching and Hamilton cycle games. Discret. Appl. Math. 332 (2023)
Siddharth Barman, Vishnu V. Narayan, Paritosh Verma
Fair Chore Division under Binary Supermodular Costs. AAMAS (2023)
Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
Fair Division via Quantile Shares. CoRR (2023)
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations. CoRR (2023)
Vishnu V. Narayan, Enguerrand Prebet, Adrian Vetta
The Declining Price Anomaly Is Not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is). Theory Comput. Syst. 66 (3) (2022)
Yaqiao Li, Vishnu V. Narayan, Denis Pankratov
Online Coloring and a New Type of Adversary for Online Graph Problems. Algorithmica 84 (5) (2022)
Vishnu V. Narayan, Gautam Rayaprolu, Adrian Vetta
Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions. Theory Comput. Syst. 66 (3) (2022)
Noah Brustle, Sarah Clusiau, Vishnu V. Narayan, Ndiamé Ndiaye, Bruce Reed, Ben Seamone
The Speed and Threshold of the Biased Perfect Matching Game. LAGOS (2021)
Vishnu V. Narayan, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta
Two Birds With One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers. CoRR (2021)
Vishnu V. Narayan, Gautam Rayaprolu, Adrian Vetta
Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR (2021)
Vishnu V. Narayan, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta
Two Birds with One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers. SAGT (2021)
Noah Brustle, Sarah Clusiau, Vishnu V. Narayan, Ndiamé Ndiaye, Bruce Reed, Ben Seamone
The Speed and Threshold of the Biased Hamilton Cycle Game. LAGOS (2021)
Johannes Brustle, Jack Dippel, Vishnu V. Narayan, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta
One Dollar Each Eliminates Envy. EC (2020)
Joe Cheriyan, Jack Dippel, Fabrizio Grandoni, Arindam Khan, Vishnu V. Narayan
The matching augmentation problem: a $\frac{7}{4}$-approximation algorithm. Math. Program. 182 (1) (2020)
Yaqiao Li, Vishnu V. Narayan, Denis Pankratov
Online Coloring and a New Type of Adversary for Online Graph Problems. WAOA (2020)
Yaqiao Li, Vishnu V. Narayan, Denis Pankratov
Online Coloring and a New Type of Adversary for Online Graph Problems. CoRR (2020)
Vishnu V. Narayan, Enguerrand Prebet, Adrian Vetta
The Declining Price Anomaly Is Not Universal in Multi-buyer Sequential Auctions (But Almost Is). SAGT (2019)
Vishnu V. Narayan, Gautam Rayaprolu, Adrian Vetta
Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions. SAGT (2019)
Johannes Brustle, Jack Dippel, Vishnu V. Narayan, Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta
One Dollar Each Eliminates Envy. CoRR (2019)
Vishnu V. Narayan, Enguerrand Prebet, Adrian Vetta
The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is). CoRR (2019)
Joe Cheriyan, Jack Dippel, Fabrizio Grandoni, Arindam Khan, Vishnu V. Narayan
The Matching Augmentation Problem: A 7/4-Approximation Algorithm. CoRR (2018)
Vishnu V. Narayan
A 17/12-approximation algorithm for 2-vertex-connected spanning subgraphs on graphs with minimum degree at least 3. CoRR (2016)