S. Matthew Weinberg

ORCID

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2009-2024
Publications (10 Years): 132

Top Venues

CoRR

ITCS

SIGecom Exch.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA (PHD)

Education History

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA

PHD

Publications

Atanas Dinev, S. Matthew Weinberg
Simple and Optimal Online Contention Resolution Schemes for k-Uniform Matroids. ITCS (2024)
Guru Guruganesh, Yoav Kolumbus, Jon Schneider, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Joshua R. Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg
Contracting with a Learning Agent. CoRR (2024)
Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Santhoshini Velusamy, S. Matthew Weinberg
An Improved Lower Bound for Matroid Intersection Prophet Inequalities. ITCS (2023)
Kiril Bangachev, S. Matthew Weinberg
q-Partitioning Valuations: Exploring the Space Between Subadditive and Fractionally Subadditive Valuations. CoRR (2023)
Linda Cai, Joshua Gardner, S. Matthew Weinberg
Optimal Stopping with Multi-Dimensional Comparative Loss Aversion. CoRR (2023)
Atanas Dinev, S. Matthew Weinberg
Simple and Optimal Online Contention Resolution Schemes for k-Uniform Matroids. CoRR (2023)
Linda Cai, S. Matthew Weinberg, Evan Wildenhain, Shirley Zhang
Selling to Multiple No-Regret Buyers. WINE (2023)
Atanas Dinev, S. Matthew Weinberg
Tight Bounds on 3-Team Manipulations in Randomized Death Match. CoRR (2023)
Linda Cai, Joshua Gardner, S. Matthew Weinberg
Optimal Stopping with Multi-dimensional Comparative Loss Aversion. WINE (2023)
Maryam Bahrani, S. Matthew Weinberg
Undetectable Selfish Mining. CoRR (2023)
Linda Cai, S. Matthew Weinberg, Evan Wildenhain, Shirley Zhang
Selling to Multiple No-Regret Buyers. CoRR (2023)
Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms. CoRR (2022)
Atanas Dinev, S. Matthew Weinberg
Tight Bounds on 3-Team Manipulations in Randomized Death Match. WINE (2022)
Orestis Plevrakis, Seyoon Ragavan, S. Matthew Weinberg
On the cut-query complexity of approximating max-cut. CoRR (2022)
Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions. ITCS (2022)
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake. EC (2022)
Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg
Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Nontruthful Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions. SIAM J. Comput. 51 (3) (2022)
Nick Arnosti, S. Matthew Weinberg
Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly. Manag. Sci. 68 (7) (2022)
S. Matthew Weinberg, Zixin Zhou
Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-Implementable. EC (2022)
José R. Correa, Andrés Cristi, Andrés Fielbaum, Tristan Pollner, S. Matthew Weinberg
Optimal Item Pricing in Online Combinatorial Auctions. IPCO (2022)
Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions. CoRR (2022)
Emily Dale, Jessica Fielding, Hari Ramakrishnan, Sacheth Sathyanarayanan, S. Matthew Weinberg
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules with Multiple Prizes. EC (2022)
Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Santhoshini Velusamy, S. Matthew Weinberg
An Improved Lower Bound for Matroid Intersection Prophet Inequalities. CoRR (2022)
Akash Gaonkar, Divya Raghunathan, S. Matthew Weinberg
The Derby Game: An Ordering-based Colonel Blotto Game. EC (2022)
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake. CoRR (2022)
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, S. Matthew Weinberg
The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-dimensional Revenue Maximization. J. ACM 68 (3) (2021)
Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design. SIAM J. Comput. 50 (3) (2021)
Maryam Bahrani, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg
Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem. CoRR (2021)
Kimberly Ding, S. Matthew Weinberg
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules in the Probabilistic Setting. ITCS (2021)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. Oper. Res. 69 (1) (2021)
Mark Braverman, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability. EC (2021)
Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, Joan Bruna, S. Matthew Weinberg
A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design. AAAI (2021)
Maryam Bahrani, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg
Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem. WINE (2021)
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness. EC (2021)
Meryem Essaidi, S. Matthew Weinberg
On Symmetries in Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design. WINE (2021)
Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, S. Matthew Weinberg
Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game. ICLR (2021)
Mark Braverman, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability. CoRR (2021)
Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Junyao Zhao
Exponential communication separations between notions of selfishness. STOC (2021)
Eric Neyman, Georgy Noarov, S. Matthew Weinberg
Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision. EC (2021)
Kimberly Ding, S. Matthew Weinberg
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules in the Probabilistic Setting. CoRR (2021)
Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. 19 (2) (2021)
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness. CoRR (2021)
Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents. EC (2020)
Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg
Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Non-Truthful Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR (2020)
Natalie Collina, S. Matthew Weinberg
On the (in)-approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer. CoRR (2020)
Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, Joan Bruna, S. Matthew Weinberg
A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design. CoRR (2020)
Meryem Essaidi, Kira Goldner, S. Matthew Weinberg
When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase. CoRR (2020)
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
Credible, Truthful, and Bounded-Round Mechanisms via Cryptographic Commitments. CoRR (2020)
Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, S. Matthew Weinberg
Auction learning as a two-player game. CoRR (2020)
Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents. CoRR (2020)
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments. EC (2020)
Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg
Separating the communication complexity of truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions. STOC (2020)
Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
Subsidy Allocations in the Presence of Income Shocks. AAAI (2020)
Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. J. ACM 67 (4) (2020)
Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Junyao Zhao
Exponential Communication Separations between Notions of Selfishness. CoRR (2020)
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard. ITCS (2020)
Natalie Collina, S. Matthew Weinberg
On the (in-)approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer. EC (2020)
Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin, Albert Zuo
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence. ITCS (2020)
Aviad Rubinstein, Jack Z. Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg
Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples. ITCS (2020)
Andrei Graur, Tristan Pollner, Vidhya Ramaswamy, S. Matthew Weinberg
New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function Minimization. ITCS (2020)
S. Matthew Weinberg, Zixin Zhou
Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Local. CoRR (2020)
Maryam Bahrani, Nicole Immorlica, Divyarthi Mohan, S. Matthew Weinberg
Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees. ICALP (2020)
Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. 18 (1) (2020)
Michael Chang, Sidhant Kaushik, S. Matthew Weinberg, Tom Griffiths, Sergey Levine
Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions. ICML (2020)
Eric Neyman, Georgy Noarov, S. Matthew Weinberg
Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision. CoRR (2020)
Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. 18 (2) (2020)
Michael Chang, Sidhant Kaushik, S. Matthew Weinberg, Thomas L. Griffiths, Sergey Levine
Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions. CoRR (2020)
Matheus Xavier Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg, Danny Yuxing Huang, Nick Feamster, Tithi Chattopadhyay
Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities. WWW (2019)
Aviad Rubinstein, Jack Z. Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg
Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples. CoRR (2019)
Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin, Albert Zuo
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence. CoRR (2019)
Pablo Daniel Azar, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information. Games Econ. Behav. 118 (2019)
Tithi Chattopadhyay, Nick Feamster, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Danny Yuxing Huang, S. Matthew Weinberg
Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities. CoRR (2019)
Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality. CoRR (2019)
Andrei Graur, Tristan Pollner, Vidhya Ramaswamy, S. Matthew Weinberg
New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function MInimization. CoRR (2019)
Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. EC (2019)
Pravesh Kothari, Sahil Singla, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries. FOCS (2019)
Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality. WINE (2019)
Pravesh Kothari, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg
Approximation Schemes for a Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries. CoRR (2019)
Nick Arnosti, S. Matthew Weinberg
Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly. ITCS (2019)
Maryam Bahrani, Nicole Immorlica, Divyarthi Mohan, S. Matthew Weinberg
Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees. CoRR (2019)
Hedyeh Beyhaghi, S. Matthew Weinberg
Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items. STOC (2019)
Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms when Demand Queries are NP-hard. CoRR (2019)
Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms. COLT (2019)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers. FOCS (2019)
Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design. Games Econ. Behav. 113 (2019)
Hu Fu, S. Matthew Weinberg
Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. 17 (2) (2019)
Jonah Brown-Cohen, Arvind Narayanan, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols. EC (2019)
Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design. CoRR (2018)
Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. CoRR (2018)
Nick Arnosti, S. Matthew Weinberg
Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly. CoRR (2018)
Constantinos Daskalakis, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 6 (3-4) (2018)
Harry A. Kalodner, Steven Goldfeder, Xiaoqi Chen, S. Matthew Weinberg, Edward W. Felten
Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts. USENIX Security Symposium (2018)
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, S. Matthew Weinberg
The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization. CoRR (2018)
Hedyeh Beyhaghi, S. Matthew Weinberg
Optimal (and Benchmark-Optimal) Competition Complexity for Additive Buyers over Independent Items. CoRR (2018)
Hu Fu, S. Matthew Weinberg
Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. 17 (1) (2018)
Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg
On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions. SODA (2018)
Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
Selling to a No-Regret Buyer. EC (2018)
Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design. SODA (2018)
Aviad Rubinstein, Tselil Schramm, S. Matthew Weinberg
Computing Exact Minimum Cuts Without Knowing the Graph. ITCS (2018)
Aviad Rubinstein, S. Matthew Weinberg
Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 6 (3-4) (2018)

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Publication Activity (10 Years)

Top Topics

Top Venues

S. Matthew Weinberg