Ophir Friedler

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2014-2021
Publications (10 Years): 12

Top Topics

Mechanism Design

Approximately Optimal

Stationary Points

Top Venues

SIGMETRICS Perform. Evaluation Rev.

Publications

Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. Oper. Res. 69 (1) (2021)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets. EC (2020)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets. SIGecom Exch. 18 (2) (2020)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets. CoRR (2019)
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein
99\% Revenue via Enhanced Competition. CoRR (2018)
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein
99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition. EC (2018)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract. EC (2017)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. EC (2017)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. CoRR (2016)
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner
Simple Auctions For Agents With Complements. CoRR (2016)
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner
Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements. EC (2016)
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. CoRR (2016)
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games. ICALP (2) (2015)
Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
Convergence to Strong Equilibrium in Network Design Games. SIGMETRICS Perform. Evaluation Rev. 43 (3) (2015)
Ophir Friedler, Wisam Kadry, Arkadiy Morgenshtein, Amir Nahir, Vitali Sokhin
Effective post-silicon failure localization using dynamic program slicing. DATE (2014)