Eric Neyman

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2018-2024
Publications (10 Years): 17

Top Topics

Computational Social Choice

Bayesian Decision

Top Venues

Publications

Eric Neyman
Algorithmic Bayesian Epistemology. CoRR (2024)
Rafael M. Frongillo, Eric Neyman, Bo Waggoner
Agreement Implies Accuracy for Substitutable Signals. EC (2023)
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
No-Regret Learning with Unbounded Losses: The Case of Logarithmic Pooling. NeurIPS (2023)
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation. Oper. Res. 71 (6) (2023)
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
No-Regret Learning with Unbounded Losses: The Case of Logarithmic Pooling. CoRR (2022)
Paul Christiano, Eric Neyman, Mark Xu
Formalizing the presumption of independence. CoRR (2022)
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
Strictly Proper Contract Functions Can Be Arbitrage-Free. AAAI (2022)
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals. EC (2022)
Rafael M. Frongillo, Eric Neyman, Bo Waggoner
Agreement Implies Accuracy for Substitutable Signals. CoRR (2021)
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals. CoRR (2021)
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation. CoRR (2021)
Eric Neyman, Georgy Noarov, S. Matthew Weinberg
Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision. EC (2021)
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation. EC (2021)
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
Strictly Proper Contract Functions Can Be Arbitrage-Free. CoRR (2021)
Eric Neyman, Georgy Noarov, S. Matthew Weinberg
Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision. CoRR (2020)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers. FOCS (2019)
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR (2018)