Ariel Schvartzman

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2016-2024
Publications (10 Years): 23

Top Topics

Multiagent Planning

Mechanism Design

Undirected Graph

Approximation Schemes

Top Venues

Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex.

Publications

Gagan Aggarwal, Andrés Perlroth, Ariel Schvartzman, Mingfei Zhao
Platform Competition in the Autobidding World. CoRR (2024)
David Miksaník, Ariel Schvartzman, Jan Soukup
On Approximately Strategy-Proof Tournament Rules for Collusions of Size at Least Three. CoRR (2024)
Sepehr Assadi, Vikram Kher, George Li, Ariel Schvartzman
Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling. EC (2023)
Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms. CoRR (2022)
Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Weinberg
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms. NeurIPS (2022)
Sepehr Assadi, Ariel Schvartzman
Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling. CoRR (2022)
Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents. EC (2020)
Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents. CoRR (2020)
Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin, Albert Zuo
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence. ITCS (2020)
Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin, Albert Zuo
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence. CoRR (2019)
Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. EC (2019)
Pravesh Kothari, Sahil Singla, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries. FOCS (2019)
Pravesh Kothari, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg
Approximation Schemes for a Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries. CoRR (2019)
Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. CoRR (2018)
Erik D. Demaine, Fermi Ma, Ariel Schvartzman, Erik Waingarten, Scott Aaronson
The fewest clues problem. Theor. Comput. Sci. 748 (2018)
Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design. SODA (2018)
Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules. ITCS (2017)
Mark Braverman, Sumegha Garg, Ariel Schvartzman
Coding in Undirected Graphs Is Either Very Helpful or Not Helpful at All. ITCS (2017)
Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design. CoRR (2017)
Young Kun Ko, Ariel Schvartzman
Bounds for the Communication Complexity of Two-Player Approximate Correlated Equilibria. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. 24 (2017)
Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules. CoRR (2016)
Erik D. Demaine, Fermi Ma, Ariel Schvartzman, Erik Waingarten, Scott Aaronson
The Fewest Clues Problem. FUN (2016)
Mark Braverman, Sumegha Garg, Ariel Schvartzman
Network coding in undirected graphs is either very helpful or not helpful at all. CoRR (2016)