Alexandros Psomas

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2022-2024
Publications (10 Years): 24

Top Topics

Incomplete Information

Mechanism Design

Top Venues

Games Econ. Behav.

Publications

Owen Eckart, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma
On the Fairness of Normalized p-Means for Allocating Goods and Chores. CoRR (2024)
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Marios Mertzanidis, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas
Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation. CoRR (2024)
Kamyar Azizzadenesheli, Trung Dang, Aranyak Mehta, Alexandros Psomas, Qian Zhang
Reward Selection with Noisy Observations. CoRR (2023)
Anuran Makur, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Athina Terzoglou
On the Robustness of Mechanism Design under Total Variation Distance. NeurIPS (2023)
Bailey Flanigan, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas
Smoothed Analysis of Social Choice Revisited. WINE (2023)
Easwar Vivek Mangipudi, Donghang Lu, Alexandros Psomas, Aniket Kate
Collusion-Deterrent Threshold Information Escrow. CSF (2023)
Christos Boutsikas, Petros Drineas, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma
Refined Mechanism Design for Approximately Structured Priors via Active Regression. NeurIPS (2023)
Rohan Garg, Alexandros Psomas
Fairly Allocating Goods in Parallel. CoRR (2023)
Christos Boutsikas, Petros Drineas, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma
Refined Mechanism Design for Approximately Structured Priors via Active Regression. CoRR (2023)
Anuran Makur, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Athina Terzoglou
On the Robustness of Mechanism Design under Total Variation Distance. CoRR (2023)
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan, Paritosh Verma
Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division. CoRR (2023)
Gerdus Benadè, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma
On the Existence of Envy-Free Allocations Beyond Additive Valuations. CoRR (2023)
Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas
Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions. NeurIPS (2022)
Shai Vardi, Alexandros Psomas, Eric J. Friedman
Dynamic Fair Resource Division. Math. Oper. Res. 47 (2) (2022)
Gerdus Benadè, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas
Dynamic Fair Division with Partial Information. NeurIPS (2022)
Bailey Flanigan, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas
Smoothed Analysis of Social Choice Revisited. CoRR (2022)
Evgenios M. Kornaropoulos, Nathaniel Moyer, Charalampos Papamanthou, Alexandros Psomas
Leakage Inversion: Towards Quantifying Privacy in Searchable Encryption. CCS (2022)
Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Weinberg
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms. NeurIPS (2022)
Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma
Fair and Efficient Allocations Without Obvious Manipulations. NeurIPS (2022)
Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma
Fair and Efficient Allocations Without Obvious Manipulations. CoRR (2022)
Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin
Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods. AAMAS (2022)
Siqi Liu, J. Benjamin Miller, Alexandros Psomas
Risk-Robust Mechanism Design for a Prospect-Theoretic Buyer. Theory Comput. Syst. 66 (3) (2022)
Christos H. Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Alexandros Psomas, Aviad Rubinstein
On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design. Games Econ. Behav. 134 (2022)
Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas
Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions. CoRR (2022)