Y. Narahari

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 1985-2024
Publications (10 Years): 77

Top Venues

CoRR

AAMAS

CASE

AAAI

Publications

V. Udaya Sankar, Vishisht Srihari Rao, Y. Narahari
Deep Learning Meets Mechanism Design: Key Results and Some Novel Applications. CoRR (2024)
Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Bazil Ahmed, Prathik Diwakar, Ganesh Ghalme, Y. Narahari
Designing Fair, Cost-optimal Auctions based on Deep Learning for Procuring Agricultural Inputs through Farmer Collectives. CoRR (2023)
Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Abhishek Chaudhary, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari
A Decision Support Tool for District Level Planning of Agricultural Crops for Maximizing Profits of Farmers. CASE (2023)
Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Bazil Ahmed, Prathik Diwakar, Ganesh Ghalme, Y. Narahari
Designing Fair, Cost-Optimal Auctions Based on Deep Learning for Procuring Agricultural Inputs Through Farmer Collectives. CASE (2023)
Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Jaydeep Pawar, Abhijnya Bhat, Deepanshu, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari
An innovative Deep Learning Based Approach for Accurate Agricultural Crop Price Prediction. CoRR (2023)
Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Jaydeep Pawar, Abhijnya Bhat, Deepanshu, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari
An Innovative Deep Learning Based Approach for Accurate Agricultural Crop Price Prediction. CASE (2023)
Amal Roy, Chandramani Singh, Y. Narahari
Recent Advances in Modeling and Control of Epidemics using a Mean Field Approach. CoRR (2022)
Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan
Achieving Envy-Freeness with Limited Subsidies under Dichotomous Valuations. CoRR (2022)
Gogulapati Sreedurga, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Y. Narahari
Maxmin Participatory Budgeting. CoRR (2022)
Rohit Patel, Inavamsi Enaganti, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Y. Narahari
A Data-Driven, Farmer-Oriented Agricultural Crop Recommendation Engine (ACRE). BDA (2022)
Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan
Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage. WINE (2022)
Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan
Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage. CoRR (2022)
Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K. J., Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
Dominant strategy truthful, deterministic multi-armed bandit mechanisms with logarithmic regret for sponsored search auctions. Appl. Intell. 52 (3) (2022)
Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Priyanka Bhatt, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari
Improving Teacher-Student Interactions in Online Educational Forums using a Markov Chain based Stackelberg Game Model. CoRR (2021)
Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari
Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. J. Mach. Learn. Res. 22 (2021)
Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
Ballooning multi-armed bandits. Artif. Intell. 296 (2021)
Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari
Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. AAAI (2020)
Shivika Narang, Arpita Biswas, Y. Narahari
On Achieving Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings. CoRR (2020)
Shivika Narang, Y. Narahari
A Study of Incentive Compatibility and Stability Issues in Fractional Matchings. CoRR (2020)
Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
Ballooning Multi-Armed Bandits. CoRR (2020)
Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
Ballooning Multi-Armed Bandits. AAMAS (2020)
Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 85 (1) (2019)
Swapnil Dhamal, Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Y. Narahari
Modeling Spread of Preferences in Social Networks for Sampling-Based Preference Aggregation. IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng. 6 (1) (2019)
Shivika Narang, Megha Byali, Pankaj Dayama, Vinayaka Pandit, Y. Narahari
Design of Trusted B2B Market Platforms using Permissioned Blockchains and Game Theory. IEEE ICBC (2019)
Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari
Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problem. CoRR (2019)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers. Theor. Comput. Sci. 783 (2019)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci. 726 (2018)
Ganesh Ghalme, Sujit Gujar, Amleshwar Kumar, Shweta Jain, Y. Narahari
Design of Coalition Resistant Credit Score Functions for Online Discussion Forums. AAMAS (2018)
Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Satyanath Bhat, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari
A quality assuring, cost optimal multi-armed bandit mechanism for expertsourcing. Artif. Intell. 254 (2018)
Swapnil Dhamal, Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Y. Narahari
Modeling Spread of Preferences in Social Networks for Sampling-based Preference Aggregation. CoRR (2017)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Frugal bribery in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci. 676 (2017)
Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K. J., Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
A Dominant Strategy Truthful, Deterministic Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism with Logarithmic Regret. CoRR (2017)
Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Y. Narahari
Information Diffusion in Social Networks in Two Phases. CoRR (2017)
Aritra Chatterjee, Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Rohit Vaish, Y. Narahari
Analysis of Thompson Sampling for Stochastic Sleeping Bandits. UAI (2017)
Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K. J., Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
A Dominant Strategy Truthful, Deterministic Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism with Logarithmic Regret. AAMAS (2017)
Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
Multi-Label Classification from Multiple Noisy Sources Using Topic Models. Inf. 8 (2) (2017)
Siddharth Barman, Arpita Biswas, Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy, Y. Narahari
Groupwise Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods. CoRR (2017)
Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
Thompson Sampling Based Mechanisms for Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problems. AAMAS (2017)
Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari
Formation of Stable Strategic Networks with Desired Topologies. CoRR (2017)
Sneha Mondal, Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari
Two-Phase Influence Maximization in Social Networks with Seed Nodes and Referral Incentives. ICWSM (2017)
D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari
On Optimal Mechanisms in the Two-Item Single-Buyer Unit-Demand Setting. CoRR (2017)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Parameterized Dichotomy of Choosing Committees Based on Approval Votes in the Presence of Outliers. AAMAS (2017)
Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Y. Narahari
Information Diffusion in Social Networks in Two Phases. IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng. 3 (4) (2016)
Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Dinesh Garg, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
A Robust UCB Scheme for Active Learning in Regression from Strategic Crowds. CoRR (2016)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting. CoRR (2016)
Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
Topic Model Based Multi-Label Classification from the Crowd. CoRR (2016)
Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms for Crowdfunding of Public Projects. CoRR (2016)
D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations. WINE (2016)
Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
Topic Model Based Multi-Label Classification. ICTAI (2016)
Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
Crowdfunding Public Projects with Provision Point: A Prediction Market Approach. ECAI (2016)
Shweta Jain, Ganesh Ghalme, Satyanath Bhat, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
A Deterministic MAB Mechanism for Crowdsourcing with Logarithmic Regret and Immediate Payments. AAMAS (2016)
Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Dinesh Garg, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari
A Robust UCB scheme for active learning in regression from strategic crowds. IJCNN (2016)
Shourya Roy, Himanshu S. Bhatt, Y. Narahari
Transfer Learning for Automatic Short Answer Grading. ECAI (2016)
Shourya Roy, Sandipan Dandapat, Y. Narahari
A Fluctuation Smoothing Approach for Unsupervised Automatic Short Answer Grading. NLP-TEA@COLING (2016)
Shourya Roy, Himanshu S. Bhatt, Y. Narahari
An Iterative Transfer Learning Based Ensemble Technique for Automatic Short Answer Grading. CoRR (2016)
Satyanath Bhat, Divya Padmanabhan, Shweta Jain, Y. Narahari
A Truthful Mechanism with Biparameter Learning for Online Crowdsourcing. CoRR (2016)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Frugal Bribery in Voting. AAAI (2016)
Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
Crowdsourced Referral Auctions. ECAI (2016)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci. 616 (2016)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting. IJCAI (2016)
D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari
Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations. CoRR (2016)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Frugal Bribery in Voting. CoRR (2015)
Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Priyanka Bhatt, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari
A Stackelberg Game Approach for Incentivizing Participation in Online Educational Forums with Heterogeneous Student Population. AAAI (2015)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Detecting Possible Manipulators in Elections. AAMAS (2015)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Manipulation is Harder with Incomplete Votes. CoRR (2015)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
On Choosing Committees Based on Approval Votes in the Presence of Outliers. CoRR (2015)
Pankaj Dayama, Balakrishnan Narayanaswamy, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari
Truthful Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Applications. AAMAS (2015)
Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
An Optimal Bidimensional Multi-Armed Bandit Auction for Multi-unit Procurement. CoRR (2015)
Palash Dey, Y. Narahari
Estimating the Margin of Victory of an Election Using Sampling. IJCAI (2015)
Arpita Biswas, Shweta Jain, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari
A Truthful Budget Feasible Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Time Critical Tasks. AAMAS (2015)
Palash Dey, Y. Narahari
Estimating the Margin of Victory of an Election using Sampling. CoRR (2015)
Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Y. Narahari
A Multi-phase Approach for Improving Information Diffusion in Social Networks. CoRR (2015)
S. Prasanna Devi, Y. Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham, S. Vinu Kiran, S. Manivannan
E-mandi implementation based on gale-shapely algorithm for perishable goods supply chain. CASE (2015)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Kernelization Complexity of Possible Winner and Coalitional Manipulation Problems in Voting. AAMAS (2015)
Arupratan Ray, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari
Profit Maximizing Prior-free Multi-unit Procurement Auctions with Capacitated Sellers. CoRR (2015)
Shourya Roy, Y. Narahari, Om D. Deshmukh
A Perspective on Computer Assisted Assessment Techniques for Short Free-Text Answers. CAA (2015)
Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari, Christopher R. Dance
Dynamic Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations. CoRR (2015)
Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Satyanath Bhat, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari
An Incentive Compatible Multi-Armed-Bandit Crowdsourcing Mechanism with Quality Assurance. CoRR (2014)
Palash Dey, Y. Narahari
Asymptotic collusion-proofness of voting rules: the case of large number of candidates. AAMAS (2014)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Detecting Possible Manipulators in Elections. CoRR (2014)
Satyanath Bhat, Swaprava Nath, Sujit Gujar, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari, Christopher R. Dance
A mechanism to optimally balance cost and quality of labeling tasks outsourced to strategic agents. AAMAS (2014)
Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari
A quality assuring multi-armed bandit crowdsourcing mechanism with incentive compatible learning. AAMAS (2014)
Madhav Marathe, Y. Narahari, Ramasuri Narayanam
Message from social networking workshop chairs. COMSNETS (2014)
Swapnil Dhamal, Akanksha Meghlan, Y. Narahari
Cooperative Game Theoretic Solution Concepts for top-$k$ Problems. CoRR (2014)
Shantanu Biswas, Deepak Bagchi, Y. Narahari
Mechanism design for sustainable virtual power plant formation. CASE (2014)
Shweta Jain, Balakrishnan Narayanaswamy, Y. Narahari
A Multiarmed Bandit Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Demand Response in Smart Grids. AAAI (2014)
Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari
Complexity of Kernelization in the Possible Winner Problem. CoRR (2014)
Chetan Yadati, Dilpreet Kaur, Narayanaswamy Balakrishnan, Avik Sarkar, Y. Narahari
Incentive compatible mechanisms for power cut allocation in smart grids. CASE (2013)
Palash Dey, Y. Narahari
Asymptotic Collusion-proofness of Voting Rules when the Number of Candidates is Large CoRR (2013)
Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions. Oper. Res. 13 (1) (2013)
Vikas K. Garg, Y. Narahari, M. Narasimha Murty
Novel Biobjective Clustering (BiGC) Based on Cooperative Game Theory. IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng. 25 (5) (2013)
Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari
Scalable Preference Aggregation in Social Networks. HCOMP (2013)
Ratul Ray, Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Y. Narahari
Eliciting high quality feedback from crowdsourced tree networks using continuous scoring rules. AAMAS (2013)
Shantanu Biswas, Deepak Bagchi, Y. Narahari, P. Suresh, S. V. Subrahmanya, L. Udaya Lakshmi, Nukala Viswanadham
Mechanism design for green, truthful procurement auctions. CASE (2012)
Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari
Sufficient Conditions for Formation of a Network Topology by Self-interested Agents CoRR (2012)
Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, James Y. Zou
Mechanism Design for Time Critical and Cost Critical Task Execution via Crowdsourcing CoRR (2012)
Deepak Bagchi, Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari, P. Suresh, L. Udaya Lakshmi, Nukala Viswanadham, S. V. Subrahmanya
Carbon footprint optimization: game theoretic problems and solutions. SIGecom Exch. 11 (1) (2012)
Pankaj Dayama, Aditya Karnik, Y. Narahari
Optimal incentive timing strategies for product marketing on social networks. AAMAS (2012)
Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, James Y. Zou
Threats and Trade-Offs in Resource Critical Crowdsourcing Tasks Over Networks. AAAI (2012)
Premm Raj H, Y. Narahari
Influence limitation in multi-campaign social networks: A Shapley value based approach. CASE (2012)

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Publication Activity (10 Years)

Top Topics

Top Venues

Y. Narahari