Gogulapati Sreedurga

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2022-2024
Publications (10 Years): 12

Top Topics

Participatory Simulation

Computationally Feasible

Top Venues

Publications

Davide Grossi, Ulrike Hahn, Michael Mäs, Andreas Nitsche, Jan Behrens, Niclas Boehmer, Markus Brill, Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi, Adrian Haret, Jobst Heitzig, Nicolien Janssens, Catholijn M. Jonker, Marijn A. Keijzer, Axel Kistner, Martin Lackner, Alexandra Lieben, Anna Mikhaylovskaya, Pradeep K. Murukannaiah, Carlo Proietti, Manon Revel, Élise Rouméas, Ehud Shapiro, Gogulapati Sreedurga, Björn Swierczek, Nimrod Talmon, Paolo Turrini, Zoi Terzopoulou, Frederik Van De Putte
Enabling the Digital Democratic Revival: A Research Program for Digital Democracy. CoRR (2024)
Gogulapati Sreedurga
Hybrid Participatory Budgeting: Divisible, Indivisible, and Beyond. AAMAS (2024)
Gogulapati Sreedurga, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Souvik Roy, Yadati Narahari
Individual-Fair and Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences. AAMAS (2023)
Gogulapati Sreedurga
Indivisible Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Degrees of Sophistication of Projects. AAMAS (2023)
Zoi Terzopoulou, Marijn A. Keijzer, Gogulapati Sreedurga, Jobst Heitzig
The Rule-Tool-User Nexus in Digital Collective Decisions. AAMAS (2023)
Gogulapati Sreedurga
Participatory Budgeting with Multiple Degrees of Projects and Ranged Approval Votes. IJCAI (2023)
Gogulapati Sreedurga
Participatory Budgeting With Multiple Degrees of Projects And Ranged Approval Votes. CoRR (2023)
Gogulapati Sreedurga, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Yadati Narahari
Maxmin Participatory Budgeting. IJCAI (2022)
Gogulapati Sreedurga, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Y. Narahari
Maxmin Participatory Budgeting. CoRR (2022)
Gogulapati Sreedurga
Participatory Budgeting: Fairness and Welfare Maximization. EUMAS (2022)
Gogulapati Sreedurga, Yadati Narahari
Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings. CoRR (2022)
Gogulapati Sreedurga, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Souvik Roy, Yadati Narahari
Characterization of Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences. CoRR (2022)