Sven Seuken

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2004-2024
Publications (10 Years): 70

Top Topics

Nash Equilibria

Combinatorial Auctions

Top Venues

Publications

Michael J. Curry, Vinzenz Thoma, Darshan Chakrabarti, Stephen McAleer, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm, Niao He, Sven Seuken
Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings. CoRR (2024)
Paul Friedrich, Yulun Zhang, Michael Curry, Ludwig Dierks, Stephen McAleer, Jiaoyang Li, Tuomas Sandholm, Sven Seuken
Scalable Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Path Finding. CoRR (2024)
Vinzenz Thoma, Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken
Computing Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Sequential Auctions. CoRR (2023)
Vinzenz Thoma, Michael Curry, Niao He, Sven Seuken
Learning Best Response Policies in Dynamic Auctions via Deep Reinforcement Learning. CoRR (2023)
Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems, Sven Seuken
Bayesian Optimization-Based Combinatorial Assignment. AAAI (2023)
Ermis Soumalias, Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Sven Seuken
Machine Learning-powered Combinatorial Clock Auction. CoRR (2023)
Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
Designing Core-Selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach. Inf. Syst. Res. 33 (4) (2022)
Ermis Soumalias, Behnoosh Zamanlooy, Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken
Machine Learning-powered Course Allocation. CoRR (2022)
Jakob Weissteiner, Chris Wendler, Sven Seuken, BenjaminLubin, Markus Püschel
Fourier Analysis-based Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI (2022)
Sven Seuken, Paul Friedrich, Ludwig Dierks
Market Design for Drone Traffic Management. AAAI (2022)
Jakob Heiss, Jakob Weissteiner, Hanna S. Wutte, Sven Seuken, Josef Teichmann
NOMU: Neural Optimization-based Model Uncertainty. ICML (2022)
Vitor Bosshard, Ye Wang, Sven Seuken
Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR (2022)
Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken
Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back. Manag. Sci. 68 (1) (2022)
Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems, Sven Seuken
Bayesian Optimization-based Combinatorial Assignment. CoRR (2022)
Nils Olberg, Sven Seuken
Enabling Trade-offs in Machine Learning-based Matching for Refugee Resettlement. CoRR (2022)
Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems, Sven Seuken
Monotone-Value Neural Networks: Exploiting Preference Monotonicity in Combinatorial Assignment. IJCAI (2022)
Manuel Beyeler, Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
iMLCA: Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding. EC (2021)
Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems, Sven Seuken
Monotone-Value Neural Networks: Exploiting Preference Monotonicity in Combinatorial Assignment. CoRR (2021)
Ludwig Dierks, Ian A. Kash, Sven Seuken
On the Cluster Admission Problem for Cloud Computing. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 71 (2021)
Jakob Heiss, Jakob Weissteiner, Hanna Wutte, Sven Seuken, Josef Teichmann
NOMU: Neural Optimization-based Model Uncertainty. CoRR (2021)
Nils Olberg, Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken, Vincent W. Slaugh, M. Utku Ünver
Search and Matching for Adoption from Foster Care. CoRR (2021)
Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken
Shapley-Based Core-Selecting Payment Rules. CoRR (2021)
Sven Seuken, Paul Friedrich, Ludwig Dierks
Market Design for Drone Traffic Management. CoRR (2021)
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem. J. Econ. Theory 191 (2021)
Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken
The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions. EC (2021)
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
An Axiomatic Decomposition of Strategyproofness for Ordinal Mechanism with Indifferences. CoRR (2020)
Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken
The Competitive Effects of Variance-based Pricing. CoRR (2020)
Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, Stefano Battiston
Default Ambiguity: Credit Default Swaps Create New Systemic Risks in Financial Networks. Manag. Sci. 66 (5) (2020)
Manuel Beyeler, Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding. CoRR (2020)
Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken
The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR (2020)
Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken
Revenue Maximization for Consumer Software: Subscription or Perpetual License? CoRR (2020)
Jakob Weissteiner, Chris Wendler, Sven Seuken, Benjamin Lubin, Markus Püschel
Fourier Analysis-based Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR (2020)
Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken
The Competitive Effects of Variance-based Pricing. IJCAI (2020)
Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken
Portfolio Compression in Financial Networks: Incentives and Systemic Risk. EC (2020)
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
Local Sufficiency for Partial Strategyproofness. CoRR (2020)
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
Two New Impossibility Results for the Random Assignment Problem. CoRR (2020)
Vitor Bosshard, Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 69 (2020)
Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken
Deep Learning-Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI (2020)
Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken
Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back. EC (2019)
Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken
Monotonic and Non-Monotonic Solution Concepts for Generalized Circuits. CoRR (2019)
Ludwig Dierks, Ian A. Kash, Sven Seuken
On the cluster admission problem for cloud computing. NetEcon@SIGMETRICS (2019)
Gianluca Brero, Sébastien Lahaie, Sven Seuken
Fast Iterative Combinatorial Auctions via Bayesian Learning. AAAI (2019)
Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken
Deep Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR (2019)
Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR (2019)
Ludwig Dierks, Ian A. Kash, Sven Seuken
The Power of Machine Learning and Market Design for Cloud Computing Admission Control. CoRR (2018)
Umut Mert Dur, Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice Mechanisms. EC (2018)
Gianluca Brero, Sébastien Lahaie, Sven Seuken
Fast Iterative Combinatorial Auctions via Bayesian Learning. CoRR (2018)
Vitor Bosshard, Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification. CoRR (2018)
Vitor Bosshard, Ye Wang, Sven Seuken
Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI (2018)
Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
Combinatorial Auctions via Machine Learning-based Preference Elicitation. IJCAI (2018)
Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
Designing Core-selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach. EC (2018)
Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken
Financing the Web of Data with Delayed-Answer Auctions. WWW (2018)
Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken
FedMark: A Marketplace for Federated Data on the Web. CoRR (2018)
Tobias Grubenmann, Daniele Dell'Aglio, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken
Make Restaurants Pay Your Server Bills. ISWC (P&D/Industry/BlueSky) (2018)
Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, Stefano Battiston
Finding Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps is PPAD-complete. ITCS (2017)
Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
Probably Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions via Machine Learning. AAAI (2017)
Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, Stefano Battiston
The Computational Complexity of Clearing Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps. CoRR (2017)
Michael Weiss, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
SATS: A Universal Spectrum Auction Test Suite. AAMAS (2017)
Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken
Challenges of Source Selection in the WoD. ISWC (1) (2017)
Mike Shann, Alper T. Alan, Sven Seuken, Enrico Costanza, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn
Save Money or Feel Cozy?: A Field Experiment Evaluation of a Smart Thermostat that Learns Heating Preferences. AAMAS (2017)
Vitor Bosshard, Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Continuous Value and Action Spaces. IJCAI (2017)
Tobias Grubenmann, Daniele Dell'Aglio, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken
Decentralizing the Semantic Web: Who Will Pay to Realize It? DeSemWeb@ISWC (2017)
Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, Stefano Battiston
Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps [Extended Abstract]. EC (2016)
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms. EC (2016)
Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken, Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein
Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions with Uncertain Availability of Goods. IJCAI (2016)
Alper T. Alan, Mike Shann, Enrico Costanza, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, Sven Seuken
It is too Hot: An In-Situ Study of Three Designs for Heating. CHI (2016)
Brandon K. Liu, David C. Parkes, Sven Seuken
Personalized Hitting Time for Informative Trust Mechanisms Despite Sybils. AAMAS (2016)
Timo Mennle, Michael Weiss, Basil Philipp, Sven Seuken
The Power of Local Manipulation Strategies in Assignment Mechanisms. IJCAI (2015)
Benedikt Bünz, Sven Seuken, Benjamin Lubin
A Faster Core Constraint Generation Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI (2015)
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
The Efficient Frontier in Randomized Social Choice. CoRR (2015)
Mike Shann, Sven Seuken
Adaptive home heating under weather and price uncertainty using GPS and mdps. AAMAS (2014)
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
An Axiomatic Approach to Characterizing and Relaxing Strategyproofness of One-sided Matching Mechanisms. CoRR (2014)
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
Relaxing strategyproofness in one-sided matching. SIGecom Exch. 13 (1) (2014)
Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes
Sybil-proof accounting mechanisms with transitive trust. AAMAS (2014)
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
The Naive versus the Adaptive Boston Mechanism. CoRR (2014)
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
An axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one-sided matching mechanisms. EC (2014)
Mike Shann, Sven Seuken
An Active Learning Approach to Home Heating in the Smart Grid. IJCAI (2013)
Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken
Partially Strategyproof Mechanisms for the Assignment Problem CoRR (2013)
Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan
Market user interface design. EC (2012)
Sven Seuken, Shlomo Zilberstein
Improved Memory-Bounded Dynamic Programming for Decentralized POMDPs CoRR (2012)
Jens Witkowski, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes
Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms. AAAI (2011)
Mike Ruberry, Sven Seuken
Sharing in BitTorrent Can Be Rational - (Extended Abstract). AMMA (2011)
Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan
Market User Interface Design - (Extended Abstract). AMMA (2011)
Sven Seuken, Jie Tang, David C. Parkes
Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems. AAAI (2010)
Sven Seuken, Denis Xavier Charles, Max Chickering, Sidd Puri
Market design & analysis for a P2P backup system. EC (2010)
Sven Seuken
Hidden market design. AAMAS (2010)
Sven Seuken, Kamal Jain, David C. Parkes
Hidden Market Design. AAAI (2010)
Sven Seuken, Kamal Jain, Desney S. Tan, Mary Czerwinski
Hidden markets: UI design for a P2P backup application. CHI (2010)
Jie Tang, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes
Hybrid transitive trust mechanisms. AAMAS (2010)
Sven Seuken, Denis Xavier Charles, Max Chickering, Sidd Puri
Market Design for a P2P Backup System. AMMA (2009)
Mark Klein, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Daniel Plakosh, Sven Seuken, Kurt C. Wallnau
Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks. NetEcon (2008)
Sven Seuken, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes
Partially Synchronized DEC-MDPs in Dynamic Mechanism Design. AAAI (2008)
Sven Seuken, Shlomo Zilberstein
Formal models and algorithms for decentralized decision making under uncertainty. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 17 (2) (2008)
Sven Seuken, Shlomo Zilberstein
Improved Memory-Bounded Dynamic Programming for Decentralized POMDPs. UAI (2007)
Sven Seuken, Shlomo Zilberstein
Memory-Bounded Dynamic Programming for DEC-POMDPs. IJCAI (2007)
Günter Müller, Torsten Eymann, Norbert Nopper, Sven Seuken
EMIKA system: architecture and prototypic realization. SMC (6) (2004)