Carmine Ventre

ORCID

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2004-2024
Publications (10 Years): 80

Top Venues

Publications

Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
Willy Wonka Mechanisms. CoRR (2024)
Pedro Braga, Georgios Chionas, Piotr Krysta, Stefanos Leonardos, Georgios Piliouras, Carmine Ventre
Who gets the Maximal Extractable Value? A Dynamic Sharing Blockchain Mechanism. AAMAS (2024)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
An Algorithmic Theory of Simplicity in Mechanism Design. CoRR (2024)
Pedro Braga, Georgios Chionas, Stefanos Leonardos, Piotr Krysta, Georgios Piliouras, Carmine Ventre
On the Redistribution of Maximal Extractable Value: A Dynamic Mechanism. CoRR (2024)
Jinyun Tong, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
Reducing Systemic Risk in Financial Networks through Donations. AAMAS (2024)
Martin Hoefer, Carmine Ventre, Lisa Wilhelmi
Algorithms for Claims Trading. STACS (2024)
Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
Willy Wonka Mechanisms. AAMAS (2024)
Haochen Li, Yue Xiao, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre
Thermodynamic Analysis of Financial Markets: Measuring Order Book Dynamics with Temperature and Entropy. Entropy 26 (1) (2024)
Martin Hoefer, Carmine Ventre, Lisa Wilhelmi
Algorithms for Claims Trading. CoRR (2024)
Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
Non-Obvious Manipulability for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral Trade. AAMAS (2023)
Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
New Constructions of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. Math. Oper. Res. 48 (1) (2023)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Explicit Payments for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. AAMAS (2023)
Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
Clearing Financial Networks with Derivatives: From Intractability to Algorithms. CoRR (2023)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Mechanism Design: (Ir)Rationality and Obvious Strategyproofness. DP@AI*IA (2023)
Haochen Li, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre
Detecting Financial Market Manipulation with Statistical Physics Tools. ICAIF (2023)
Luke Thorburn, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre
Error in the Euclidean Preference Model. AAMAS (2023)
Ziyi Wang, Carmine Ventre, Maria Polukarov
Robust Market Making: To Quote, or not To Quote. ICAIF (2023)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality. EC (2023)
Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, Carmine Ventre
Strategic Bidding Wars in On-chain Auctions. CoRR (2023)
Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents. IJCAI (2023)
Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
Financial networks with singleton liability priorities. Theor. Comput. Sci. 963 (2023)
Lingxiao Zhao, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre
Liquidity and Solvency Risks in Financial Networks. ICAIF (2023)
Luke Thorburn, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre
Error in the Euclidean Preference Model. IJCAI (2023)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality. CoRR (2023)
Luke Thorburn, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre
Information Loss in Euclidean Preference Models. CoRR (2022)
Elizabeth Black, Martim Brandão, Oana Cocarascu, Bart de Keijzer, Yali Du, Derek Long, Michael Luck, Peter McBurney, Albert Meroño-Peñuela, Simon Miles, Sanjay Modgil, Luc Moreau, Maria Polukarov, Odinaldo Rodrigues, Carmine Ventre
Reasoning and interaction for social artificial intelligence. AI Commun. 35 (4) (2022)
Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Priorities. SAGT (2022)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation. Theory Comput. Syst. 66 (3) (2022)
Ji Qi, Carmine Ventre
Incentivising Market Making in Financial Markets. ICAIF (2022)
Chunli Liu, Carmine Ventre, Maria Polukarov
Synthetic Data Augmentation for Deep Reinforcement Learning in Financial Trading. ICAIF (2022)
Buhong Liu, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre, Lingbo Li, Leslie Kanthan, Fan Wu, Michail Basios
The Spoofing Resistance of Frequent Call Markets. AAMAS (2022)
Yuanzi Zhu, Carmine Ventre
Irrational Behaviour and Globalisation. AAMAS (2022)
Andrew Alden, Carmine Ventre, Blanka Horvath, Gordon Lee
Model-Agnostic Pricing of Exotic Derivatives Using Signatures. ICAIF (2022)
Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
Non-Obvious Manipulability for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral Trade. CoRR (2022)
Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Derivatives. ICALP (2022)
Yanqing Ma, Carmine Ventre, Maria Polukarov
Denoised Labels for Financial Time Series Data via Self-Supervised Learning. ICAIF (2022)
Ji Qi, Carmine Ventre
Accounting for Strategic Response in Limit Order Book Dynamics. PRIMA (2022)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Approximation Guarantee of OSP Mechanisms: The Case of Machine Scheduling and Facility Location. Algorithmica 83 (2) (2021)
Yanqing Ma, Carmine Ventre, Maria Polukarov
Denoised Labels for Financial Time-Series Data via Self-Supervised Learning. CoRR (2021)
Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre
Efficient Truthful Scheduling and Resource Allocation through Monitoring. AAAI (2021)
Buhong Liu, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre, Lingbo Li, Leslie Kanthan
Call Markets with Adaptive Clearing Intervals. AAMAS (2021)
Zheng Gong, Carmine Ventre, John G. O'Hara
The efficient hedging frontier with deep neural networks. ICAIF (2021)
Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality. WINE (2021)
Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre
Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Financial Derivatives. CoRR (2021)
Buhong Liu, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre, Lingbo Li, Leslie Kanthan
Agent-based markets: equilibrium strategies and robustness. ICAIF (2021)
Fan Fang, Carmine Ventre, Lingbo Li, Leslie Kanthan, Fan Wu, Michail Basios
Better Model Selection with a new Definition of Feature Importance. CoRR (2020)
Bart de Keijzer, Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre
Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions. ICALP (2020)
Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality. CoRR (2020)
Fan Fang, Waichung Chung, Carmine Ventre, Michail Basios, Leslie Kanthan, Lingbo Li, Fan Wu
Ascertaining price formation in cryptocurrency markets with DeepLearning. CoRR (2020)
Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
Novel Paradigm for the design of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. ICTCS (2020)
Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre, Angelina Vidali
Truthfulness on a budget: trading money for approximation through monitoring. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 34 (1) (2020)
Fan Fang, Carmine Ventre, Michail Basios, Hoiliong Kong, Leslie Kanthan, Lingbo Li, David Martínez-Rego, Fan Wu
Cryptocurrency Trading: A Comprehensive Survey. CoRR (2020)
Zheng Gong, Carmine Ventre, John G. O'Hara
Classifying high-frequency FX rate movements with technical indicators and inception model. ICAIF (2020)
Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
Automated Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Set Systems - The Case of Small Domains. WINE (2019)
Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre, Long Tran-Thanh, Jie Zhang, Bo An, Nick R. Jennings
Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance. PRICAI (2) (2019)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Metastability of the Logit Dynamics for Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games. ACM Trans. Algorithms 15 (2) (2019)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation - The Case of Machine Scheduling. SAGT (2019)
Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre, Xiaomeng Zhang
Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location. SAGT (2019)
Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre
Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms without Money for Scheduling. AAMAS (2019)
Christopher Culley, Ji Qi, Carmine Ventre
How to Get the Most from Goods Donated to Charities. AAMAS (2019)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Social pressure in opinion dynamics. Theor. Comput. Sci. 795 (2019)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation. AAMAS (2019)
Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre, Long Tran-Thanh, Jie Zhang, Bo An, Nick R. Jennings
Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance. CoRR (2019)
Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling. ESA (2019)
Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre, Angelina Vidali
Truthfulness on a Budget: Trading Money for Approximation through Monitoring. AAMAS (2019)
Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre
The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 62 (2018)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. AAMAS (2018)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. CoRR (2018)
Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre
Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions. Theor. Comput. Sci. 745 (2018)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. IJCAI (2018)
Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
On the approximation guarantee of obviously strategyproof mechanisms. CoRR (2018)
Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre
Combinatorial Auctions Without Money. Algorithmica 77 (3) (2017)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Obvious Strategyproofness Needs Monitoring for Good Approximations. AAAI (2017)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Social Pressure in Opinion Games. IJCAI (2017)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Obvious Strategyproofness Needs Monitoring for Good Approximations. CoRR (2017)
Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre
Towards Better Models of Externalities in Sponsored Search Auctions. ECAI (2016)
Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre
Towards Better Models of Externalities in Sponsored Search Auctions. CoRR (2016)
Diodato Ferraioli, Paul W. Goldberg, Carmine Ventre
Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games. Theor. Comput. Sci. 648 (2016)
Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre
What to Verify for Optimal Truthful Mechanisms without Money. AAMAS (2016)
Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre
Heterogeneous facility location without money. Theor. Comput. Sci. 636 (2016)
Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre
Cascade Model with Contextual Externalities and Bounded User Memory for Sponsored Search Auctions. AAMAS (2015)
Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre
Truthful Mechanisms without Money for Non-Utilitarian Heterogeneous Facility Location. AAAI (2015)
Annamária Kovács, Ulrich Meyer, Carmine Ventre
Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation. WINE (2015)
Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, Carmine Ventre
Mechanisms for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 53 (2015)
Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre
The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design. AAMAS (2015)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre
Metastability of Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games - (Extended Abstract). MFCS (2) (2015)
Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, Carmine Ventre
Near-Optimal Approximation Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI (2015)
Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre, Gabor Aranyi
A Mechanism Design Approach to Measure Awareness. AAAI (2015)
Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre
Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable. Theor. Comput. Sci. 571 (2015)
Fabrizio Grandoni, Piotr Krysta, Stefano Leonardi, Carmine Ventre
Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multiobjective Optimization. SIAM J. Comput. 43 (4) (2014)
Carmine Ventre
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification. Theor. Comput. Sci. 518 (2014)
Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre
Combinatorial auctions without money. AAMAS (2014)
Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. Games Econ. Behav. 86 (2014)
Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre
Truthful mechanisms for the location of different facilities. AAMAS (2014)
Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre
Heterogeneous Facility Location without Money on the Line. ECAI (2014)
Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, Carmine Ventre
Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods. AAMAS (2013)
Diodato Ferraioli, Paul W. Goldberg, Carmine Ventre
Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games. CoRR (2013)
Paul W. Goldberg, Rahul Savani, Troels Bjerre Sørensen, Carmine Ventre
On the approximation performance of fictitious play in finite games. Int. J. Game Theory 42 (4) (2013)
Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre
Ranking Games that have Competitiveness-based Strategies CoRR (2013)
Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre
Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies. Theor. Comput. Sci. 476 (2013)

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Publication Activity (10 Years)

Top Topics

Top Venues

Carmine Ventre