Afshin Nikzad

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2010-2023
Publications (10 Years): 10

Top Topics

Mechanism Design

Internet Advertising

Approximation Algorithms

Top Venues

Games Econ. Behav.

Publications

Samantha Robertson, Tonya Nguyen, Cathy Hu, Catherine Albiston, Afshin Nikzad, Niloufar Salehi
Expressiveness, Cost, and Collectivism: How the Design of Preference Languages Shapes Participation in Algorithmic Decision-Making. CHI (2023)
Afshin Nikzad
Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism Design. EC (2022)
Itai Ashlagi, Faidra Georgia Monachou, Afshin Nikzad
Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design. EC (2021)
Afshin Nikzad
Persuading a pessimist: Simplicity and robustness. Games Econ. Behav. 129 (2021)
Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad
What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design. J. Econ. Theory 190 (2020)
Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad, Assaf Romm
Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules. Games Econ. Behav. 115 (2019)
Nima Anari, Gagan Goel, Afshin Nikzad
Budget Feasible Procurement Auctions. Oper. Res. 66 (3) (2018)
Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Afshin Nikzad, Amin Saberi
Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations. ACM Trans. Algorithms 13 (4) (2017)
Gagan Goel, Stefano Leonardi, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Afshin Nikzad, Renato Paes Leme
Reservation Exchange Markets for Internet Advertising. ICALP (2016)
Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad
What Matters in School Choice Tie-breakings?: How Competition Guides Design. EC (2016)
Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Afshin Nikzad, Amin Saberi
Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations. CoRR (2015)
Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Afshin Nikzad, Amin Saberi
Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations. ICALP (1) (2015)
Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad, Assaf Romm
Assigning More Students to their Top Choices: A Tiebreaking Rule Comparison. EC (2015)
Nima Anari, Gagan Goel, Afshin Nikzad
Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets. FOCS (2014)
Nima Anari, Gagan Goel, Afshin Nikzad
Mechanisms Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Approximate Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets. CoRR (2014)
Afshin Nikzad, R. Ravi
Sending Secrets Swiftly: Approximation Algorithms for Generalized Multicast Problems. ICALP (2) (2014)
Gagan Goel, Afshin Nikzad, Adish Singla
Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing Markets with Heterogeneous Tasks. HCOMP (2014)
Gagan Goel, Afshin Nikzad, Adish Singla
Allocating tasks to workers with matching constraints: truthful mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets. WWW (Companion Volume) (2014)
Takuro Fukunaga, Afshin Nikzad, R. Ravi
Deliver or hold: Approximation Algorithms for the Periodic Inventory Routing Problem. APPROX-RANDOM (2014)
Shayan Ehsani, Mohammad Ghodsi, Ahmad Khajenezhad, Hamid Mahini, Afshin Nikzad
Optimal online pricing with network externalities. Inf. Process. Lett. 112 (4) (2012)
Saieed Akbari, Vahid Liaghat, Afshin Nikzad
Colorful Paths in Vertex Coloring of Graphs. Electron. J. Comb. 18 (1) (2011)
Hessameddin Akhlaghpour, Mohammad Ghodsi, Nima Haghpanah, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Hamid Mahini, Afshin Nikzad
Optimal Iterative Pricing over Social Networks (Extended Abstract). WINE (2010)