EC

Publications

2023

Simon Finster, Michelle González Amador, Edwin Lock, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío, Evi Micha, Ariel D. Procaccia
Welfare-Maximizing Pooled Testing. EC (2023)
Mikhail Panov
Agreements of Continuous-Time Games. EC (2023)
Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi
Interviewing Matching in Random Markets. EC (2023)
Ziyun Chen, Zhiyi Huang, Dorsa Majdi, Zipeng Yan
Strong Revenue (Non-)Monotonicity of Single-parameter Auctions. EC (2023)
Guru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, Joshua R. Wang, Junyao Zhao
The Power of Menus in Contract Design. EC (2023)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Johannes Knörr
Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Electricity Markets. EC (2023)
Nima Anari, Moses Charikar, Prasanna Ramakrishnan
Distortion in metric matching with ordinal preferences. EC (2023)
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz
Ambiguous Contracts. EC (2023)
Suho Shin, Keivan Rezaei, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi
Delegating to Multiple Agents. EC (2023)
Elliot Lipnowski, Doron Ravid
Predicting Choice from Information Costs. EC (2023)
Qing Feng, Ruihao Zhu, Stefanus Jasin
Temporal Fairness in Learning and Earning: Price Protection Guarantee and Phase Transitions. EC (2023)
Bailey Flanigan, Ariel D. Procaccia, Sven Wang
Distortion Under Public-Spirited Voting. EC (2023)
Johannes Bäumler, Martin Bullinger, Stefan Kober, Donghao Zhu
Superiority of Instantaneous Decisions in Thin Dynamic Matching Markets. EC (2023)
Jamie Tucker-Foltz, Richard J. Zeckhauser
Playing Divide-and-Choose Given Uncertain Preferences. EC (2023)
Ioannis Anagnostides, Fivos Kalogiannis, Ioannis Panageas, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Stephen McAleer
Algorithms and Complexity for Computing Nash Equilibria in Adversarial Team Games. EC (2023)
Ran Eilat, Zvika Neeman, Eilon Solan
Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections. EC (2023)
Markus Baldauf, Christoph Frei, Joshua Mollner
Principal Trading Arrangements: Optimality under Temporary and Permanent Price Impact. EC (2023)
Sulagna Dasgupta
Communication via hard and soft information. EC (2023)
Yizhou Jin
Re-examining Moral Hazard under Inattention: New Evidence from Behavioral Data in Auto Insurance. EC (2023)
Ivan-Aleksandar Mavrov, Kamesh Munagala, Yiheng Shen
Fair Multiwinner Elections with Allocation Constraints. EC (2023)
Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi
A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling. EC (2023)
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Shiri Ron
On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings. EC (2023)
Jiarui Gan, Minbiao Han, Jibang Wu, Haifeng Xu
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria. EC (2023)
Eric Balkanski, Yuri Faenza, Noémie Périvier
The Power of Greedy for Online Minimum Cost Matching on the Line. EC (2023)
Rajan Udwani
Adwords with Unknown Budgets and Beyond. EC (2023)
Yilun Chen, Yash Kanoria, Akshit Kumar, Wenxin Zhang
Feature Based Dynamic Matching. EC (2023)
Yanqiu Ruan, Xiaobo Li, Karthyek Murthy, Karthik Natarajan
A Nonparametric Approach with Marginals for Modeling Consumer Choice. EC (2023)
Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer
Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation. EC (2023)
Ariel Boyarsky, Hongseok Namkoong, Jean Pouget-Abadie
Modeling Interference Using Experiment Roll-out. EC (2023)
Martin Bichler, Maximilian Fichtl, Matthias Oberlechner
Computing Bayes Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Auction Games via Simultaneous Online Dual Averaging. EC (2023)
Battal Dogan, Lars Ehlers
Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets. EC (2023)
Joseph Y. Halpern, Aditya Saraf
Chunking Tasks for Present-Biased Agents. EC (2023)
Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao, Kangning Wang
Regret Minimization with Noisy Observations. EC (2023)
Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Jan Vondrák
Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees. EC (2023)
Georgios Piliouras, Fang-Yi Yu
Multi-agent Performative Prediction: From Global Stability and Optimality to Chaos. EC (2023)
Farbod Ekbatani, Yiding Feng, Rad Niazadeh
Online Resource Allocation with Buyback: Optimal Algorithms via Primal-Dual. EC (2023)
Kun Zhang
Withholding Verifiable Information. EC (2023)
Sulagna Dasgupta
Optimal Test Design for Knowledge-based Screening. EC (2023)
Hannaneh Akrami, Noga Alon, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn, Ruta Mehta
EFX: A Simpler Approach and an (Almost) Optimal Guarantee via Rainbow Cycle Number. EC (2023)
T. Tony Ke, Song Lin, Michelle Y. Lu
Information Design of Online Platforms. EC (2023)
Xiaowei Wu, Cong Zhang, Shengwei Zhou
Weighted EF1 Allocations for Indivisible Chores. EC (2023)
Ido Bright, Arthur Delarue, Ilan Lobel
Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices. EC (2023)
Mohammad Akbarpour, Piotr Dworczak, Frank Yang
Comparison of Screening Devices. EC (2023)
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah
Best of Both Distortion Worlds. EC (2023)
Markus Brill, Jannik Peters
Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting. EC (2023)
Kai-Hao Yang, Alexander Zentefis
Extreme Points and First-Order Stochastic Dominance: Theory and Applications. EC (2023)
José R. Correa, Andrés Cristi, Paul Duetting, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Jan Olkowski, Kevin Schewior
Trading Prophets. EC (2023)
Yangge Xiao, Zhenyu Hu, Shouqiang Wang
Information Design of a Delegated Search. EC (2023)
Mohak Goyal, Geoffrey Ramseyer, Ashish Goel, David Mazières
Finding the Right Curve: Optimal Design of Constant Function Market Makers. EC (2023)
Guy Aridor, Duarte Gonçalves, Daniel Kluver, Ruoyan Kong, Joseph A. Konstan
The Economics of Recommender Systems: Evidence from a Field Experiment on MovieLens. EC (2023)