Tristan Tomala

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 1998-2024
Publications (10 Years): 22

Top Topics

Bregman Divergences

Message Transmission

Congestion Games

Social Learning

Top Venues

Games Econ. Behav.

J. Econ. Theory

Publications

Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala
Splitting games over finite sets. Math. Program. 203 (1) (2024)
Antoine Lagarde, Tristan Tomala
Optimality and fairness of partisan gerrymandering. Math. Program. 203 (1) (2024)
Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala
Corrigendum to "Social learning in nonatomic routing games" [Games Econ. Behav. 132 (2022) 221-233]. Games Econ. Behav. 138 (2023)
Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala
Social learning in nonatomic routing games. Games Econ. Behav. 132 (2022)
Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, Tristan Tomala
Interactive Information Design. Math. Oper. Res. 47 (1) (2022)
Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala
Strategic Communication with Decoder Side Information. ISIT (2021)
Frédéric Koessler, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala
Information Design in Large Games. CoRR (2021)
Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala
Point-to-Point Strategic Communication. ITW (2020)
Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala
Bayesian Learning in Dynamic Nonatomic Routing Games. WINE (2020)
Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala
Bayesian Learning in Dynamic Non-atomic Routing Games. CoRR (2020)
Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala
Point-to-Point Strategic Communication. CoRR (2020)
Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala
Strategic Communication with Side Information at the Decoder. CoRR (2019)
Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala
Persuasion with limited communication capacity. J. Econ. Theory 184 (2019)
Fabien Gensbittel, Stefano Lovo, Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala
Zero-sum revision games. Games Econ. Behav. 108 (2018)
Marco Scarsini, Marc Schröder, Tristan Tomala
Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows. Oper. Res. 66 (2) (2018)
Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala
Information-Theoretic Limits of Strategic Communication. CoRR (2018)
Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala
Information Design for Strategic Coordination of Autonomous Devices with Non-Aligned Utilities. CoRR (2017)
Marie Laclau, Tristan Tomala
Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring. J. Econ. Theory 169 (2017)
Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala
Persuasion with limited communication resources. CoRR (2017)
Maël Le Treust, Tristan Tomala
Information design for strategic coordination of autonomous devices with non-aligned utilities. Allerton (2016)
Marco Scarsini, Marc Schröder, Tristan Tomala
Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows. CoRR (2016)
Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala
Approximate implementation in Markovian environments. J. Econ. Theory 159 (2015)
Jérôme Renault, Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala
Secure message transmission on directed networks. Games Econ. Behav. 85 (2014)
Tristan Tomala
Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games. Math. Oper. Res. 38 (4) (2013)
Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan, Tristan Tomala
Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. Games Econ. Behav. 74 (1) (2012)
Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala
Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality. Int. J. Game Theory 41 (3) (2012)
Tristan Tomala
Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems. Oper. Res. 59 (3) (2011)
Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala
General Properties of Long-Run Supergames. Dyn. Games Appl. 1 (2) (2011)
Johannes Hörner, Stefano Lovo, Tristan Tomala
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence. J. Econ. Theory 146 (5) (2011)
Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala
Mechanism design and communication networks. BQGT (2010)
Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala
Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality. BQGT (2010)
Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala
Secure communication: A mechanism design approach. GAMENETS (2009)
Tristan Tomala
Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Games Econ. Behav. 67 (2) (2009)
Olivier Gossner, Rida Laraki, Tristan Tomala
Informationally optimal correlation. Math. Program. 116 (1-2) (2009)
Jérôme Renault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala
Playing off-line games with bounded rationality. Math. Soc. Sci. 56 (2) (2008)
Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala
Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks. J. Cryptol. 21 (2) (2008)
Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala
Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. Math. Oper. Res. 32 (2) (2007)
Jérôme Renault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala
A Minority Game with Bounded Recall. Math. Oper. Res. 32 (4) (2007)
Olivier Gossner, Tristan Tomala
Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation. Math. Oper. Res. 31 (1) (2006)
Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala
Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals. Games Econ. Behav. 47 (1) (2004)
Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala
Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Games Econ. Behav. 49 (2) (2004)
Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala
Repeated proximity games. Int. J. Game Theory 27 (4) (1998)
Tristan Tomala
Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation. Int. J. Game Theory 27 (1) (1998)