Ton Storcken

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 1993-2022
Publications (10 Years): 5

Top Topics

Preference Elicitation

Active Databases

Axiomatic Characterization

Top Venues

Soc. Choice Welf.

Math. Soc. Sci.

Publications

Shashwat Khare, Ton Storcken
Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information. Soc. Choice Welf. 59 (3) (2022)
Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh, Ton Storcken
An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule. Soc. Choice Welf. 56 (4) (2021)
Edurne Falcó, Madhuparna Karmokar, Souvik Roy, Ton Storcken
On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules. Soc. Choice Welf. 55 (4) (2020)
Abhinaba Lahiri, Ton Storcken
Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval. Soc. Choice Welf. 53 (1) (2019)
Abhinaba Lahiri, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken
Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model. Math. Soc. Sci. 90 (2017)
Burak Can, Ali Ihsan Ozkes, Ton Storcken
Measuring polarization in preferences. Math. Soc. Sci. 78 (2015)
Burak Can, Ton Storcken
Update monotone preference rules. Math. Soc. Sci. 65 (2) (2013)
Hans Peters, Souvik Roy, Ton Storcken
On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules. Soc. Choice Welf. 39 (2-3) (2012)
Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken
Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences. Games Econ. Behav. 64 (2) (2008)
Stefan Maus, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken
Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions. Math. Soc. Sci. 53 (3) (2007)
Stefan Maus, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken
Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability. J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007)
Stefan Maus, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken
Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity. Soc. Choice Welf. 29 (2) (2007)
Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken
Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences. Int. J. Game Theory 33 (3) (2005)
Herman Monsuur, Ton Storcken
Centers in Connected Undirected Graphs: An Axiomatic Approach. Oper. Res. 52 (1) (2004)
Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken
Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems. Games Econ. Behav. 49 (1) (2004)
Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken
Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox. Math. Soc. Sci. 43 (2) (2002)
Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken
Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences. J. Econ. Theory 105 (2) (2002)
Bettina Klaus, Ton Storcken
Choice correspondences for public goods. Soc. Choice Welf. 19 (1) (2002)
Ton Storcken
Effectivity functions and simple games. Int. J. Game Theory 26 (2) (1997)
Hans Peters, Hans van der Stel, Ton Storcken
Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms. ZOR Methods Model. Oper. Res. 38 (1) (1993)
Hans Peters, Hans van der Stel, Ton Storcken
Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes. ZOR Methods Model. Oper. Res. 38 (2) (1993)