Shreyas Sekar

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2012-2024
Publications (10 Years): 38

Top Topics

Optimal Pricing

Additively Separable

Top Venues

Publications

Evi Micha, Shreyas Sekar, Nisarg Shah
What is Best for Students, Numerical Scores or Letter Grades? CoRR (2024)
Negin Golrezaei, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Jon Schneider, Shreyas Sekar
Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users. Oper. Res. 71 (4) (2023)
Shreyas Sekar
Technical Perspective: A Rare Glimpse of Tracking Fake Reviews. Commun. ACM 66 (10) (2023)
Pan Li, Shreyas Sekar, Baosen Zhang
A Capacity-Price Game for Uncertain Renewables Resources. IEEE Trans. Sustain. Comput. 7 (3) (2022)
Kris J. Ferreira, Sunanda Parthasarathy, Shreyas Sekar
Learning to Rank an Assortment of Products. Manag. Sci. 68 (3) (2022)
Negin Golrezaei, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Jon Schneider, Shreyas Sekar
Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users. EC (2021)
Shreyas Sekar, Milan Vojnovic, Se-Young Yun
A Test Score-Based Approach to Stochastic Submodular Optimization. Manag. Sci. 67 (2) (2021)
Shreyas Sekar, Liyuan Zheng, Lillian J. Ratliff, Baosen Zhang
Uncertainty in Multicommodity Routing Networks: When Does It Help? IEEE Trans. Autom. Control. 65 (11) (2020)
Negin Golrezaei, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Jon Schneider, Shreyas Sekar
Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users. CoRR (2020)
Lillian J. Ratliff, Roy Dong, Shreyas Sekar, Tanner Fiez
A Perspective on Incentive Design: Challenges and Opportunities. Annu. Rev. Control. Robotics Auton. Syst. 2 (2019)
Tanner Fiez, Shreyas Sekar, Liyuan Zheng, Lillian J. Ratliff
Combinatorial Bandits for Incentivizing Agents with Dynamic Preferences. UAI (2018)
Lillian J. Ratliff, Shreyas Sekar, Liyuan Zheng, Tanner Fiez
Incentives in the Dark: Multi-armed Bandits for Evolving Users with Unknown Type. CoRR (2018)
Tanner Fiez, Shreyas Sekar, Liyuan Zheng, Lillian J. Ratliff
Combinatorial Bandits for Incentivizing Agents with Dynamic Preferences. CoRR (2018)
Charalampos E. Tsourakakis, Shreyas Sekar, Johnson Lam, Liu Yang
Risk-Averse Matchings over Uncertain Graph Databases. CoRR (2018)
Pan Li, Shreyas Sekar, Baosen Zhang
A Capacity-Price Game for Uncertain Renewables Resources. CoRR (2018)
Charalampos E. Tsourakakis, Shreyas Sekar, Johnson Lam, Liu Yang
Risk-Averse Matchings over Uncertain Graph Databases. ECML/PKDD (2) (2018)
Pan Li, Shreyas Sekar, Baosen Zhang
A Capacity-Price Game for Uncertain Renewables Resources. e-Energy (2018)
Shreyas Sekar, Liyuan Zheng, Lillian J. Ratliff, Baosen Zhang
Uncertainty in Multi-Commodity Routing Networks: When does it help? ACC (2018)
Shreyas Sekar, Liyuan Zheng, Lillian J. Ratliff, Baosen Zhang
Uncertainty in Multi-Commodity Routing Networks: When does it help? CoRR (2017)
Shreyas Sekar
Posted Pricing sans Discrimination. IJCAI (2017)
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing. EC (2017)
Shreyas Sekar, Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia
Condorcet Consistent Bundling with Social Choice. AAMAS (2017)
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar, Zaid Bin Tariq
Balancing social utility with aggregator profit in electric vehicle charging. SmartGridComm (2017)
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar
Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 5 (3) (2017)
Shreyas Sekar, Milan Vojnovic, Se-Young Yun
Sketching with Test Scores and Submodular Maximization. CoRR (2016)
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World. WINE (2016)
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Blind, Greedy, and Random: Algorithms for Matching and Clustering Using Only Ordinal Information. AAAI (2016)
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar
Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets. CoRR (2016)
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing. CoRR (2016)
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar
Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets. WINE (2016)
Shreyas Sekar
Posted Pricing sans Discrimination. CoRR (2016)
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World. CoRR (2016)
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Blind, Greedy, and Random: Ordinal Approximation Algorithms for Graph Problems. CoRR (2015)
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing. CoRR (2015)
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing. WINE (2015)
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Price Competition in Networked Markets: How Do Monopolies Impact Social Welfare? WINE (2015)
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar
Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare. CoRR (2015)
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar
Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare. ICALP (1) (2015)
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Approximate Equilibrium and Incentivizing Social Coordination. CoRR (2014)
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Market price competition in networks: How do monopolies impact social welfare? CoRR (2014)
Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar
Approximate Equilibrium and Incentivizing Social Coordination. AAAI (2014)
Shreyas Sekar, Patrick Maillé
Exploiting the 'Web of Trust' to improve efficiency in collaborative networks CoRR (2012)