Dolors Berga

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2000-2023
Publications (10 Years): 4

Top Topics

Objective Function

Top Venues

Soc. Choice Welf.

Games Econ. Behav.

Math. Soc. Sci.

Int. J. Game Theory

Publications

Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Antonio Nicolò
Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain. Soc. Choice Welf. 60 (1) (2023)
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models. Games Econ. Behav. 131 (2022)
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel. Soc. Choice Welf. 54 (2-3) (2020)
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
Immunity to credible deviations from the truth. Math. Soc. Sci. 90 (2017)
Kentaro Hatsumi, Dolors Berga, Shigehiro Serizawa
A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model. Int. J. Game Theory 43 (1) (2014)
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
Some New Domain Restrictions in Social Choice, and Their Consequences. MDAI (2013)
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient? Games Econ. Behav. 75 (2) (2012)
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences. Soc. Choice Welf. 39 (2-3) (2012)
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results. Int. J. Game Theory 41 (4) (2012)
Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? J. Econ. Theory 145 (5) (2010)
Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno
Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences. Soc. Choice Welf. 32 (2) (2009)
Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit. Math. Soc. Sci. 54 (2) (2007)
Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme
On Exiting After Voting. Int. J. Game Theory 34 (1) (2006)
Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme
Stability and voting by committees with exit. Soc. Choice Welf. 23 (2) (2004)
Dolors Berga
Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes. Soc. Choice Welf. 19 (1) (2002)
Dolors Berga, Shigehiro Serizawa
Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good. J. Econ. Theory 90 (1) (2000)