Free Market of Crowdsourcing: Incentive Mechanism Design for Mobile Sensing.
Xinglin ZhangZheng YangZimu ZhouHaibin CaiLei ChenXiangyang LiPublished in: IEEE Trans. Parallel Distributed Syst. (2014)
Keyphrases
- mechanism design
- prediction markets
- double auction
- game theory
- moral hazard
- social welfare
- cooperative game theory
- incomplete information
- incentive compatibility
- mobile devices
- incentive compatible
- multiagent planning
- information asymmetry
- auction mechanisms
- game theoretic
- combinatorial auctions
- approximately optimal
- decision making
- cooperative
- resource allocation
- sensor networks
- market prices
- envy freeness
- meeting scheduling
- market share
- trading strategies
- stock market
- supply chain
- upper bound
- dynamic programming