Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents.
Sophie KlumperGuido SchäferPublished in: SAGT (2022)
Keyphrases
- mechanism design
- trading agents
- auction mechanisms
- multi attribute auctions
- resource allocation
- strategy proof
- multi attribute
- combinatorial auctions
- multi agent
- bidding strategies
- autonomous agents
- reverse auction
- negotiation mechanism
- incentive compatibility
- intelligent agents
- multi criteria
- electronic marketplaces
- incentive compatible
- multi agent systems
- multiagent systems
- supply chain management
- learning mechanisms
- multiple agents
- online auctions
- social welfare
- trading strategies
- mobile agents
- cooperative
- supply chain
- learning agents
- agent architecture
- agent systems
- software agents
- feasible solution
- incomplete information
- decision making
- multi unit
- auction protocol
- agent technology
- coalition formation
- agent negotiation
- group buying
- electronic commerce
- trading agent competition
- envy freeness