Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Procurement Auctions with Divisible Agents.
Sophie KlumperGuido SchäferPublished in: CoRR (2022)
Keyphrases
- mechanism design
- trading agents
- auction mechanisms
- multi attribute
- multi attribute auctions
- multi agent
- strategy proof
- combinatorial auctions
- resource allocation
- bidding strategies
- negotiation mechanism
- multi agent systems
- multi criteria
- reverse auction
- incentive compatible
- multiagent systems
- supply chain management
- game theory
- incomplete information
- budget constraints
- supply chain
- multi unit
- envy freeness
- cooperative
- electronic commerce
- intelligent agents
- autonomous agents
- incentive compatibility
- multiple agents
- software agents
- electronic marketplaces
- dynamic environments
- double auction
- artificial agents
- trading strategies
- envy free
- auction protocol
- game theoretic
- negotiation protocol
- agent technology
- social choice
- agent systems
- mobile agents
- information revelation
- learning mechanisms
- social welfare