Optimizing Affine Maximizer Auctions via Linear Programming: An Application to Revenue Maximizing Mechanism Design for Zero-Day Exploits Markets.
Mingyu GuoHideaki HataMuhammad Ali BabarPublished in: PRIMA (2017)
Keyphrases
- mechanism design
- linear programming
- auction mechanisms
- double auction
- prediction markets
- social welfare
- bidding strategies
- incentive compatibility
- linear program
- combinatorial auctions
- game theory
- incomplete information
- market share
- cooperative game theory
- incentive compatible
- mathematical programming
- multiagent planning
- approximately optimal
- optimal solution
- multi unit
- electronic commerce
- sealed bid auctions
- multi attribute
- np hard
- learning agents
- electronic markets
- software agents
- lower bound
- meeting scheduling
- cooperative
- objective function