Optimizing Affine Maximizer Auctions via Linear Programming: an Application to Revenue Maximizing Mechanism Design for Zero-Day Exploits Markets.
Mingyu GuoHideaki HataAli BabarPublished in: CoRR (2020)
Keyphrases
- mechanism design
- linear programming
- auction mechanisms
- double auction
- prediction markets
- social welfare
- incentive compatibility
- bidding strategies
- combinatorial auctions
- game theory
- incomplete information
- linear program
- multiagent planning
- incentive compatible
- approximately optimal
- cooperative game theory
- np hard
- mathematical programming
- optimal solution
- electronic commerce
- market share
- dynamic programming
- objective function
- multi attribute
- dynamic pricing
- negotiation mechanism
- test bed
- optimization problems
- multi agent systems
- vickrey clarke groves