Mechanism design for e-procurement auctions: On the efficacy of post-auction negotiation and quality effort incentives.
He HuangRobert J. KauffmanHongyan XuLan ZhaoPublished in: Electron. Commer. Res. Appl. (2011)
Keyphrases
- mechanism design
- auction mechanisms
- multi attribute auctions
- negotiation mechanism
- game theory
- combinatorial auctions
- incomplete information
- social welfare
- multiagent planning
- incentive compatible
- incentive compatibility
- reverse auction
- cooperative
- winner determination
- approximately optimal
- moral hazard
- double auction
- multi agent
- prediction markets
- multi agent systems
- strategy proof
- software agents
- group buying
- envy freeness
- game theoretic
- electronic commerce
- multi unit
- resource allocation
- special case
- sealed bid