Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions
Balasubramanian SivanVasilis SyrgkanisOmer TamuzPublished in: CoRR (2012)
Keyphrases
- approximately optimal
- mechanism design
- lower bound
- auction mechanisms
- incentive compatibility
- sealed bid auctions
- upper bound
- social welfare
- game theory
- incomplete information
- combinatorial auctions
- np hard
- branch and bound algorithm
- incentive compatible
- resource allocation
- group buying
- lower and upper bounds
- objective function
- reverse auction
- branch and bound
- optimal solution
- worst case
- approximation ratio
- return on investment
- vc dimension
- multi unit
- linear programming
- online algorithms
- sponsored search
- learning algorithm
- multi attribute
- strategy proof
- special case
- auction protocol
- reinforcement learning