Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions.
Balasubramanian SivanVasilis SyrgkanisOmer TamuzPublished in: WINE (2012)
Keyphrases
- approximately optimal
- mechanism design
- lower bound
- auction mechanisms
- sealed bid auctions
- incentive compatibility
- upper bound
- social welfare
- game theory
- combinatorial auctions
- incomplete information
- resource allocation
- branch and bound algorithm
- branch and bound
- group buying
- np hard
- incentive compatible
- lower and upper bounds
- multi unit
- optimal solution
- objective function
- worst case
- approximation ratio
- reverse auction
- vc dimension
- multi attribute
- bidding strategies
- online algorithms
- dynamic pricing
- online auctions
- approximation algorithms
- greedy algorithm
- utility function
- auction protocol
- information revelation