Partially Informed Agents Can Form a Swarm in a Nash Equilibrium.
Aykut YildizArif Bülent ÖzgülerPublished in: IEEE Trans. Autom. Control. (2015)
Keyphrases
- nash equilibrium
- game theoretic
- mixed strategy
- nash equilibria
- game theory
- solution concepts
- pure strategy
- pareto optimal
- partially observable stochastic games
- stochastic games
- cooperative
- incentive compatible
- multi agent systems
- equilibrium strategies
- multiagent systems
- multi agent
- coalition formation
- multiple agents
- trust model
- intelligent agents
- repeated games
- incomplete information
- multi agent learning
- cooperative games
- dynamic environments
- decision making
- search space
- single agent
- variational inequalities
- particle swarm optimization
- resource allocation
- finite horizon
- rational agents
- multi objective
- decision theoretic
- supply chain
- fictitious play
- worst case
- swarm intelligence
- decision problems
- autonomous agents
- stackelberg game
- pure nash equilibria