Credible equilibria in non-finite games and ingames without perfect recall.
P. Corcho SánchezJ. L. Ferreira GarcíaPublished in: Ann. Oper. Res. (1998)
Keyphrases
- nash equilibria
- game theoretic
- nash equilibrium
- pure nash equilibria
- game theory
- pure strategy
- extensive form games
- pure nash equilibrium
- repeated games
- high precision
- incomplete information
- fictitious play
- stochastic games
- finite number
- precision and recall
- solution concepts
- multiagent learning
- game design
- mixed strategy
- computer games
- neural network
- fixed point
- decision problems
- game development
- resource allocation
- multi agent systems
- congestion games
- long run
- learning agents
- imperfect information
- online game
- game playing
- influence diagrams
- cooperative