Mechanism Design for Set Cover Games When Elements Are Agents.
Zheng SunXiang-Yang LiWeizhao WangXiaowen ChuPublished in: AAIM (2005)
Keyphrases
- mechanism design
- game theory
- set cover
- game theoretic
- cooperative game theory
- approximation algorithms
- incomplete information
- greedy algorithm
- combinatorial auctions
- incentive compatible
- multi agent systems
- nash equilibria
- multiagent planning
- np hard
- network flow
- moral hazard
- nash equilibrium
- cooperative
- social welfare
- solution space
- greedy heuristic
- convex hull
- solution concepts
- resource allocation
- multiagent systems
- multi agent
- learning agents
- strategy proof
- auction mechanisms
- coalition structures
- social choice
- envy freeness
- multiple agents
- double auction
- metaheuristic