How reverse information sharing supports pricing and sales effort decisions: Signaling game-based incentive mechanism design.
Jianhu CaiHaining SunXiaoqing HuWenqing ZhangPublished in: Comput. Ind. Eng. (2023)
Keyphrases
- mechanism design
- information sharing
- game theory
- social welfare
- incomplete information
- information exchange
- share information
- decision making
- incentive compatibility
- approximately optimal
- data sharing
- combinatorial auctions
- multiagent planning
- emergency response
- government agencies
- knowledge sharing
- moral hazard
- incentive compatible
- public safety
- cooperative
- public sector
- auction mechanisms
- law enforcement
- virtual communities
- e government
- homeland security
- decision makers
- inter organizational
- dynamic pricing
- criminal justice
- multi agent systems