Source-sink cooperation dynamics constrain institutional evolution in a group-structured society.
Laurent Hébert-DufresneTimothy M. WaringGuillaume St-OngeMeredith T. NilesLaura Kati CorlewMatthew P. DubeStephanie J. MillerNicholas GotelliBrian J. McGillPublished in: CoRR (2021)
Keyphrases
- evolutionary game theory
- temporal evolution
- artificial intelligence
- game theory
- multi agent systems
- population dynamics
- network dynamics
- information systems
- prior knowledge
- dynamical systems
- higher education
- social groups
- natural selection
- socio economic
- data transmission
- data sets
- cooperative
- information sharing
- information exchange
- sensor networks
- evolutionary algorithm
- highly nonlinear
- multi agent
- case study
- genetic algorithm
- information retrieval
- real world