Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents.
Xiang-Yang LiZheng SunWeizhao WangXiaowen ChuShaojie TangPing XuPublished in: Theor. Comput. Sci. (2010)
Keyphrases
- mechanism design
- game theory
- set cover
- nash equilibrium
- game theoretic
- incentive compatible
- nash equilibria
- resource allocation
- approximation algorithms
- multi agent systems
- greedy algorithm
- cooperative game theory
- incomplete information
- combinatorial auctions
- cooperative
- multiagent planning
- solution concepts
- network flow
- np hard
- moral hazard
- social welfare
- pareto optimal
- learning agents
- auction mechanisms
- convex hull
- autonomous agents
- solution space
- multi agent
- primal dual
- special case
- strategy proof
- double auction
- greedy heuristic
- software agents
- coalitional games
- social choice
- preference aggregation
- lower bound