Beyond the VCG mechanism: truthful reverse auctions for relay selection with high data rates, high base station utility and low interference in D2D networks.
M. V. S. AdityaHarsh PancholiP. PriyankaGaurav S. KasbekarPublished in: Wirel. Networks (2020)
Keyphrases
- base station
- mechanism design
- cellular networks
- auction mechanisms
- strategy proof
- wireless networks
- wireless sensor networks
- reverse auction
- sealed bid
- data transmission
- sensor networks
- game theory
- energy consumption
- energy efficient
- incentive compatible
- communication networks
- mobile networks
- incomplete information
- ad hoc networks
- mobile users
- combinatorial auctions
- sensor nodes
- relay nodes
- quasi linear
- incentive compatibility
- cooperative
- social networks
- multi hop
- wireless ad hoc networks
- multipath
- multi attribute
- computer networks
- network structure
- resource allocation
- sensor data
- mobile phone