Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs.
Dominik KressSebastian MeiswinkelErwin PeschPublished in: Discret. Appl. Math. (2018)
Keyphrases
- identical machines
- incentive compatible
- number of late jobs
- single machine
- completion times
- release times
- processing times
- mechanism design
- scheduling problem
- job scheduling
- single machine scheduling problem
- social choice
- scheduling jobs
- precedence constraints
- release dates
- incentive compatibility
- rational agents
- nash equilibrium
- flowshop
- incomplete information
- setup times
- game theory
- sequence dependent setup times
- dynamic programming
- combinatorial auctions
- identical parallel machines
- competitive ratio
- branch and bound algorithm
- cooperative
- multi agent
- special case
- game theoretic