Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy.
Yiling ChenStephen ChongIan A. KashTal MoranSalil P. VadhanPublished in: ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. (2016)
Keyphrases
- mechanism design
- strategy proof
- multi agent systems
- incentive compatible
- multi agent
- private information
- combinatorial auctions
- incomplete information
- privacy preserving
- multiple agents
- game theory
- multiagent systems
- cooperative
- software agents
- intelligent agents
- resource allocation
- decision making
- social welfare
- mobile agents
- security mechanisms
- dynamic environments
- artificial agents
- agent architecture
- multi party
- game theoretic
- autonomous agents
- decision theoretic
- trust model
- learning agents
- personal information
- access control
- incentive compatibility
- open distributed systems