Reputation incentives with public supervision promote cooperation in evolutionary games.
Qi HuTao JinYulian JiangXingwen LiuPublished in: Appl. Math. Comput. (2024)
Keyphrases
- incentive mechanism
- game theory
- knowledge sharing
- moral hazard
- evolutionary game theory
- free riding
- evolutionary computation
- reputation mechanisms
- computer games
- anonymous communication
- cooperative
- mechanism design
- genetic algorithm
- video games
- evolutionary optimization
- nash equilibria
- game theoretic
- multi agent systems
- multi agent
- perfect information
- active learning
- nash equilibrium
- online game
- reputation models
- imperfect information
- game design
- electronic marketplaces
- educational games
- reputation systems
- neural network
- reputation management
- seller agents
- natural selection
- evolutionary algorithm
- game playing
- game play
- information exchange