VCG Mechanism Design with Unknown Agent Values under Stochastic Bandit Feedback.
Kirthevasan KandasamyJoseph E. GonzalezMichael I. JordanIon StoicaPublished in: J. Mach. Learn. Res. (2023)
Keyphrases
- mechanism design
- social welfare
- double auction
- game theory
- incomplete information
- vickrey clarke groves
- multi agent systems
- incentive compatible
- multiagent planning
- multiagent systems
- combinatorial auctions
- multi agent
- envy freeness
- negotiation mechanism
- autonomous agents
- incentive compatibility
- intelligent agents
- auction mechanisms
- multiple agents
- social choice
- prediction markets
- cooperative
- cooperative game theory
- decision making
- approximately optimal
- agent oriented
- moral hazard
- dynamic programming
- software agents
- game theoretic
- decision theoretic
- markov chain
- regret bounds
- attribute values