SPASC: Strategy-proof auction mechanism with cost and QoS incentive for service composition.
Yao XiaZhiqiu HuangYonglong ZhangMin YuanShangguang WangYu ZhouPublished in: Concurr. Comput. Pract. Exp. (2021)
Keyphrases
- service composition
- strategy proof
- auction mechanisms
- qos aware
- service selection
- web services composition
- web services
- web service selection
- web service composition
- mechanism design
- quasi linear
- game theory
- resource allocation
- quality of service
- web service compositions
- combinatorial auctions
- service oriented
- composite services
- multi attribute
- petri net
- budget constraints
- sealed bid
- incentive compatibility
- multiple criteria
- online auctions
- incomplete information
- special case
- multi criteria
- bidding strategies
- social welfare
- multi agent systems