Taiki Todo

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2009-2022
Publications (10 Years): 28

Top Topics

Facility Location

Social Networks

Mechanism Design

Top Venues

Publications

Sung-Ho Cho, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Two-Sided Matching over Social Networks. IJCAI (2022)
Koji Osoegawa, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Wheel Graphs. PRIMA (2022)
Bo You, Ludwig Dierks, Taiki Todo, Minming Li, Makoto Yokoo
Strategy-Proof House Allocation with Existing Tenants over Social Networks. AAMAS (2022)
Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Manipulation-resistant false-name-proof facility location mechanisms for complex graphs. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 36 (1) (2022)
Taiki Todo, Ryoji Wada, Kentaro Yahiro, Makoto Yokoo
Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information. ADT (2021)
Takehiro Kawasaki, Ryoji Wada, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Mechanism Design for Housing Markets over Social Networks. AAMAS (2021)
Zhaohong Sun, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
New Algorithms for Japanese Residency Matching. IJCAI (2021)
Zhaohong Sun, Taiki Todo, Toby Walsh
Fair Pairwise Exchange among Groups. IJCAI (2021)
Taiki Todo
Mechanism Design with Uncertainty. IJCAI (2020)
Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanaël Barrot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network. AAAI (2020)
Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Split Manipulations in Cost Sharing of Minimum Cost Spanning Tree. ECAI (2020)
Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, Makoto Yokoo
False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Discrete Structures. ECAI (2020)
Seiji Takanashi, Takehiro Kawasaki, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Efficiency in Truthful Auctions via a Social Network. CoRR (2019)
Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanaël Barrot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network. CoRR (2019)
Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Group of Agents. COCOON (2019)
Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, Makoto Yokoo
False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Discrete Structures. CoRR (2019)
Nodoka Okada, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
SAT-Based Automated Mechanism Design for False-Name-Proof Facility Location. PRIMA (2019)
Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Manipulations-resistant Facility Location Mechanisms for ZV-line Graphs. AAMAS (2019)
Takamasa Ihara, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
Strategy-proof Cake Cutting Mechanisms for All-or-nothing Utility. Fundam. Informaticae 158 (1-3) (2018)
Chi Kit Ken Fong, Minming Li, Pinyan Lu, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Facility Location Games With Fractional Preferences. AAAI (2018)
Julien Lesca, Taiki Todo
Service Exchange Problem. IJCAI (2018)
Yuho Wada, Tomohiro Ono, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Facility Location with Variable and Dynamic Populations. AAMAS (2018)
Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Manipulation-resistant facility location mechanisms for ZV-line graphs. CoRR (2018)
Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange under Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 63 (2018)
Tomohiro Ono, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Rename and False-Name Manipulations in Discrete Facility Location with Optional Preferences. PRIMA (2017)
Yuto Tominaga, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Manipulations in Two-Agent Sequential Allocation with Random Sequences. AAMAS (2016)
Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets. PRIMA (2016)
Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
False-Name-Proof Locations of Two Facilities: Economic and Algorithmic Approaches. AAAI (2016)
Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
Fairness and False-Name Manipulations in Randomized Cake Cutting. AAMAS (2015)
Mingyu Guo, Hong Shen, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
Social Decision with Minimal Efficiency Loss: An Automated Mechanism Design Approach. AAMAS (2015)
Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, Saya Onoue, Ken-ichi Matsumoto
Characteristics of Sustainable OSS Projects: A Theoretical and Empirical Study. CHASE@ICSE (2015)
Takamasa Ihara, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
Strategy-Proof Cake Cutting Mechanisms for All-or-Nothing Utility. PRIMA (2015)
Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange with Multiple Indivisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences. AAAI (2015)
Zhaohong Sun, Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Exchange of Indivisible Objects with Asymmetry. IJCAI (2015)
Atsushi Iwasaki, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Hidenao Iwane, Hirokazu Anai, Mingyu Guo, Makoto Yokoo
Parametric Mechanism Design via Quantifier Elimination. AAMAS (2015)
Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
Predicting Own Action: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Induced by Proper Scoring Rules. HCOMP (2014)
Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yujiro Kawasaki, Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
Optimal false-name-proof single-item redistribution mechanisms. AAMAS (2014)
Julien Lesca, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice. AAMAS (2014)
Taiki Todo, Haixin Sun, Makoto Yokoo
Strategyproof Exchange with Multiple Private Endowments. AAAI (2014)
Akihisa Sonoda, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
Two Case Studies for Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences. AAAI (2014)
Dengji Zhao, Siqi Luo, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo
False-name-proof Combinatorial Auction Design via Single-minded Decomposition. ECAI (2014)
Taiki Todo, Vincent Conitzer
False-name-proof matching. AAMAS (2013)
Atsushi Iwasaki, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Miao Yao, Makoto Yokoo
VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism: general framework for constructing iterative combinatorial auction mechanisms. AAMAS (2013)
Taiki Todo, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
False-name-proofness in online mechanisms. AAMAS (2012)
Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
False-name-proof mechanism design without money. AAMAS (2011)
Taiki Todo, Runcong Li, Xuemei Hu, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
Generalizing Envy-Freeness toward Group of Agents. IJCAI (2011)
Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
Characterization of Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions. IAT (2010)
Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
False-Name-Proofness in Facility Location Problem on the Real Line. WINE (2010)
Taiki Todo
Characterization of false-name-proof social choice mechanisms. AAMAS (2010)
Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Mingyu Guo, Makoto Yokoo
Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. AAMAS (2010)
Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
Characterization of Strategy-Proof, Revenue Monotone Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms and Connection with False-Name-Proofness. WINE (2009)
Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS (1) (2009)