Mete Seref Ahunbay

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2020-2024
Publications (10 Years): 14

Top Topics

Reverse Auction

Linear Programming

Electricity Markets

Top Venues

ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.

Publications

Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Teodora Dobos, Johannes Knörr
Solving large-scale electricity market pricing problems in polynomial time. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 318 (2) (2024)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler
On the Uniqueness of Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Standard First-Price and All-Pay Auctions. CoRR (2024)
Mete Seref Ahunbay
Local (coarse) correlated equilibria in non-concave games. CoRR (2024)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Teodora Dobos, Johannes Knörr
Solving Large-Scale Electricity Market Pricing Problems in Polynomial Time. CoRR (2023)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Johannes Knörr
Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Electricity Markets. EC (2023)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 11 (2023)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler, Johannes Knörr
Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Markets: Theory and Applications to Electricity Markets. CoRR (2022)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-buyer Sequential Auctions. SAGT (2021)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming. CoRR (2021)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming. SAGT (2021)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions. CoRR (2020)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding. CoRR (2020)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding. SAGT (2020)
Mete Seref Ahunbay, Adrian Vetta
The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions. WINE (2020)