Jerry S. Kelly

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 1997-2020
Publications (10 Years): 4

Top Topics

Preference Aggregation

Computationally Feasible

Top Venues

Math. Soc. Sci.

Soc. Choice Welf.

Publications

Jerry S. Kelly
Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence. Math. Soc. Sci. 108 (2020)
Jerry S. Kelly, Shaofang Qi
Balancedness of social choice correspondences. Math. Soc. Sci. 102 (2019)
Jerry S. Kelly, Shaofang Qi
Balancedness of Social Choice Correspondences. CoRR (2018)
Jerry S. Kelly, Shaofang Qi
A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda's rule. Soc. Choice Welf. 47 (1) (2016)
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Social choice trade-off results for conditions on triples of alternatives. Math. Soc. Sci. 77 (2015)
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization. Soc. Choice Welf. 43 (2) (2014)
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Uniformly bounded sufficient sets and quasitransitive social choice. Math. Soc. Sci. 65 (1) (2013)
Donald E. Campbell, Jack E. Graver, Jerry S. Kelly
There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think. Math. Soc. Sci. 64 (3) (2012)
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Strategy-proofness and weighted voting. Math. Soc. Sci. 60 (1) (2010)
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Pareto, anonymity, and independence: four alternatives. Soc. Choice Welf. 29 (1) (2007)
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives. Soc. Choice Welf. 29 (1) (2007)
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation. Math. Soc. Sci. 51 (1) (2006)
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Correction to: 'Information and preference aggregation'. Soc. Choice Welf. 24 (3) (2005)
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems. Soc. Choice Welf. 20 (2) (2003)
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Non-monotonicity does not imply the no-show paradox. Soc. Choice Welf. 19 (3) (2002)
Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly
Information and preference aggregation. Soc. Choice Welf. 17 (1) (2000)
Peter C. Fishburn, Jerry S. Kelly
Super Arrovian Domains with Strict Preferences. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 10 (1) (1997)