Colin Rowat

Publication Activity (10 Years)

Years Active: 2011-2023
Publications (10 Years): 10

Top Topics

Reasoning Processes

Higher Order Logic

Vickrey Clarke Groves

Top Venues

MKM/Calculemus/DML

Int. J. Game Theory

Math. Comput. Sci.

Publications

Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat, Naoki Yoshihara
Asymmetric majority pillage games. Int. J. Game Theory 52 (4) (2023)
Chris Harris, Richard Pymar, Colin Rowat
Joint Shapley values: a measure of joint feature importance. ICLR (2022)
Chris Harris, Richard Pymar, Colin Rowat
Joint Shapley values: a measure of joint feature importance. CoRR (2021)
Gabriel Deza, Adelin Travers, Colin Rowat, Nicolas Papernot
Interpretability in Safety-Critical FinancialTrading Systems. CoRR (2021)
Christopher Frye, Colin Rowat, Ilya Feige
Asymmetric Shapley values: incorporating causal knowledge into model-agnostic explainability. NeurIPS (2020)
Christopher Frye, Ilya Feige, Colin Rowat
Asymmetric Shapley values: incorporating causal knowledge into model-agnostic explainability. CoRR (2019)
Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat
An Introduction to Mechanized Reasoning. CoRR (2016)
Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat
VCG - Combinatorial Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Auctions. Arch. Formal Proofs 2015 (2015)
Simon Mackenzie, Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat
Pillage games with multiple stable sets. Int. J. Game Theory 44 (4) (2015)
Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat
Sound Auction Specification and Implementation. EC (2015)
Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat
Set Theory or Higher Order Logic to Represent Auction Concepts in Isabelle? CoRR (2014)
Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat
Set Theory or Higher Order Logic to Represent Auction Concepts in Isabelle? CICM (2014)
Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat
Foreword. Math. Comput. Sci. 8 (1) (2014)
Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat
Budget Imbalance Criteria for Auctions: A Formalized Theorem. CoRR (2014)
Colin Rowat, Manfred Kerber
Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games. Math. Soc. Sci. 69 (2014)
Christoph Lange, Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Till Mossakowski, Colin Rowat, Makarius Wenzel, Wolfgang Windsteiger
A Qualitative Comparison of the Suitability of Four Theorem Provers for Basic Auction Theory CoRR (2013)
Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat
Proving soundness of combinatorial Vickrey auctions and generating verified executable code. CoRR (2013)
Christoph Lange, Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat
Applying Mechanised Reasoning in Economics - Making Reasoners Applicable for Domain Experts. GI-Jahrestagung (2013)
Christoph Lange, Marco B. Caminati, Manfred Kerber, Till Mossakowski, Colin Rowat, Makarius Wenzel, Wolfgang Windsteiger
A Qualitative Comparison of the Suitability of Four Theorem Provers for Basic Auction Theory. MKM/Calculemus/DML (2013)
Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat, Manfred Kerber
The ForMaRE Project --- Formal Mathematical Reasoning in Economics CoRR (2013)
Christoph Lange, Colin Rowat, Manfred Kerber
The ForMaRE Project - Formal Mathematical Reasoning in Economics. MKM/Calculemus/DML (2013)
Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat, Wolfgang Windsteiger
in the Formalization of Theoretical Economics. Calculemus/MKM (2011)
Ian Ayres, Colin Rowat, Nasser Zakariya
Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees. Soc. Choice Welf. 36 (2) (2011)
Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat
A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games. Int. J. Game Theory 40 (3) (2011)